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CHAPTER I: BACKGROUND 
INTRODUCTION 
During recent years, the term "ambiguity" has been 
applied to a wide variety of stimulus conditions. It has 
been studied in settings ranging from the most rigidly con-
trolled experimental designs to the opposite extreme of ~ 
post facto investigations, as in disaster studies. However, 
a thorough review of the literature reveals that the consid-
erable "popularity" of the term is quite out of proportion 
to the clarity of ambiguity as a term or concept. Somehow, 
psychologists seem to have assumed that there is a common 
understanding of the nature of ambiguity, and thus no need to 
dwell on its components. Unfortunately, a review of the 
literature invalidates this assumption. Not only is there 
confusion about the meaning of ambiguity, but also there is 
little concern evidenced for its place in any of the theoret-
ical areas or conceptual models within which it has been uaed. 
Thia may partially explain the many contradictory findings 
which have resulted in studies involving ambiguity as a vari-
able. It is the purpose of the study reported here to demon-
strate a different approach to the meaning of ambiguity and 
to suggest a fruitful means of conceptualizing and measuring 
l 
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it. Specifically, we shall attempt to show that the resolu-
tion of ambiguous visual stimuli can be predicted and ex-
plained as a function of several attributes of conflicting 
response tendencies aroused by the stimuli. In addition, 
this approach will be shown to involve a rapprochement between 
the general model of perception offered by Bruner and some 
previously established propositions concerning resolution of 
conflict derived from behavior theory. It is quite conceiv-
able that the approach to be taken here can aid in the un-
tangling of some of the definitional confusions and empirical 
contradictions to be found in the existing literature. 
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
There are two major groupings of studies to be covered 
in this report. One, covering studies in which ambiguity 
has been defined (nominally or operationally) as involving 
conflicting or contradictory properties, will be covered in 
a subsequent section. The other is useful at this point to 
give the reader some feeling for the sources of confusion 
mentioned above. This group of studies and articles can ten-
tatively be subdivided into the four headings below. 1 
1. Studies involving ambiguity have had varied purposes. 
a) Ambiguous stimuli have been used as convenient 
1. In each case, the articles cited are meant to exemplify 
the text--they are by no means an exhaustive coverage of 
the available literature. 
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devices to facilitate the investigation of relationships 
between other variables. Murray (47) asked his subjects 
to describe the picture of a man under different condi-
tions to demonstrate the effects upon perception of dif-
ferent emotional states. While the picture itself was 
perfectly clear, the instructions to the subjects left 
their response completely open (the conception of am-
biguity put forth in this paper stresses that it does 
not reside in the stimulus alone). Sanford (53, 54) and 
later Levine, Chein, and Murphy (36) used indistinct or 
masked images to measure the effects of food deprivation 
on the perception of objects--or, more generally, the re-
lationship between physiological states and perceptual 
responses. In a series of highly quoted experiments 
Sherif (56)--and later many others--employed the auto-
kinetic effect to investigate norm formation in "alone" 
and "together" settings. In the above and many other 
studies, ambiguity itself was not the focus of investi-
gation, but merely a facilitative device. Consequently 
little attention was paid to the nature of the definitions 
or modes of inducing it. 
b) The best known uses of ambiguous figures have been 
for purposes of psychodiagnostic testing. The Rorschach, 
the T.A.T., various sentence completion and word associa-
tion tests have for years now served to elicit from 
clients and patients responses indicative of underlying 
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personality processes, especially those or a disruptive 
nature. Here again, ambiguity is the "deus ex maohina" 
which facilitates the study of matters separate from 
ambiguity itself. The only direct look at the images 
has been for the purpose of establishing frequencies of 
responses, thus, standardization of scoring procedures. 
c) A series of experiments have emanated more or less 
directly from Prenkel-Brunswik's (24, 25) concern with 
the concept of "tolerance-intolerance of ambiguity" in 
personality. Smook (61) induced anxiety to investigate 
its effects on intolerance or ambiguity as a behavioral 
response. Taft (62) found a positive relationship be-
tween ethnocentrism and intolerance of ambiguity, with 
more prejudiced subjects showing greater conformity both 
to instruction set and partner's estimates in the auto~ 
kinetic setting. This finding confirmed an earlier re-
sult obtained by Block and Block (8). Millon (46) and 
O'Conner (48) also present corroborating evidence, al-
though at least one study (Davids, 20) failed to find 
the relationship. In addition, Kenny and Ginsberg (34) 
measured the intercorrelations between twelve measures 
or intolerance of ambiguity (including some of those 
used in the above mentioned studies). Only rive of over 
sixty r's were found to reach the .05 level of signiri-
cance in the predicted direction, leading the authors to 
the conclusion that intolerance ot ambiguity is not a 
general tra1 t. 
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d) Another group of studies exemplify a fourth use of 
ambiguity, in which it is induced as an independent vari-
able in order to investigate its effects on a variety of 
internal and behavioral responses. Weiner, !,! g. (65). 
tested the hypothesis that stimulus ambiguity would lead 
to greater conformity behavior, but the hypothesis was 
not confirmed. In other studies, ambiguity has been 
shown to affect anxiety level (Dibner, 22), response 
stability (Wiggins, 66), and group productivity and sat-
isfaction (Smith, 60). The employment of ambiguity as 
the independent variable is about the only common ele-
ment in these studies--the induction of it (and con-
comitantly its operational status) varies greatly. This, 
then, brings us to a second major source or contusion. 
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2. There exists a wide variety of definitions of ambiguity, 
some of which are explicit, others implicit in experimental 
operations. The more explicit attempts have been, for the 
moat part, at nominal definitions. Luchins (40), in one ot 
the few articles devoted specifically to the conceptualization 
of ambiguity, calla for more "precise definitions in order to 
provide a common universe of discourse." He first separates 
structuredness from ambiguity by reserving structure as a 
subjective frame of reference and citing ambiguity as a stimu-
lus variable only [following lines set down by Chapman and 
Volkmann (16) and also McGregor (44)]. Torrance (64) exempli-
fies this distinction in summarizing studies of bomber crew 
survivals with the statement that "In some oases ••• the 
situation is so ambiguous that structuring is difficult." 
Having thus hopefUlly stated a locus for the concept, Luchins 
defines ambiguity in terms of the "permissiveness" of the 
stimulus, 1. e., the degree to which the stimulus permits "a 
range of possible structurizations" regardless or the 
strength or valence of the structures. Unfortunately, in 
disregarding these latter aspects of the structuring, and in 
failing to develop an independent means of measuring the 
range of structures, Luchins has failed to clear the air. 
It means that the measurement of ambiguity either has no re-
lationship to the concept--in which case the concept 
approaches uselessness for research purposes--or that another 
step toward either operational or response definitions must 
be taken, with no avenues for this step indicated. 
While Luchins 1 attempt at a nominal definition is the 
most explicit to be found, others do abound. Wiggins (66), 
for example, speaks of the "degree of structure an individual 
attributes to a given stimulus." Hudson (30), in a similar 
vein, cites as ambiguous "stimuli • . • that are difficult 
to organize meaningfUlly." Another approach, stressing the 
idea of conflicting or contradictory elements in the per-
ceiving situation, is suggested by Dibner (22) who speaks of 
an ambiguous stimulus as one in which "cues may be absent, 
vague, inconsistent or contradictory." This is an approach 
which will come up again when we look at the induction and 
measurement of ambiguity in the absence of any explicit 
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nominal definitions. 
In contrast to the above, many investigators have adopted 
an operational approach to definition, although it is not 
clear in many cases whether this has been determined by a 
philosophical commitment to operationalism or by an under-
standable inability to find a suitable all-embracing nominal 
definition. For example, Martin (43) had subjects work on 
problems in the absence of any objective cues as to what 
lines to follow. Here ambiguity is seen as the absence of 
cues, and Martin's measure of subjects' intolerance of am-
biguity was the number of clarifying (cue-search) questions 
asked. Similarly, Smith (60) studied the effects of ambigu-
ous role expectations by putting a silent member into a 
group discussion. Wiggins (66) measured the ambiguity of 
written protocols by the degree of interjudge agreement on 
stimulus properties. Davids (20) did the same thing with 
Rorschach concepts, and in addition formed a second ambigu-
ous stimulus by building into a passage to be memorized "con-
tradictory and conflicting" cues. This study should be noted 
carefully, for it provides an example of two "ambiguous" 
stimuli induced by very different techniques. This is not an 
.isolated case. Similar occurrenoescan be found in studies by 
Hamilton (27), Martin (43), Eriksen and Eisenstein (23), and 
Raven and Rietsema (49). It is difficult to find a common 
definitional element in studies with such varying operations--
operations which presumably are inducing and measuring the 
7 
same psychological phenomenon. 
3. Still a third source of confusion arises from the uses 
to which Frenkel-Brunswik's term "intolerance of ambiguity" 
has been put, and the number of contradictory findings which 
have plagued investigators of this concept. The idea of in-
tolerance of ambiguity was most fUlly enunciated by Frenkel-
Brunswik in 1949 (25). Briefly, the central hypothesis set 
forth was that deep-seated ambivalence toward parental fig-
ures developed during childhood would lead to the inability 
later to deal successfully with ambiguous situations. How-
ever, it is not made clear just what status is to be assigned 
to this inability. Frenkel-Brunswik speaks of "emotional 
ambiguities" (ambivalence), "ambiguity of cognitive re-
sponses" (response variability), "ambivalent or ambiguous 
qualities" (of traits), and "intolerance or ambiguity, or 
rigidity" (a response pattern). Throughout the article, she 
attributes to intolerance of ambiguity the status of person-
ality variable, intervening construct, and response pattern. 
At the same time, in so doing she suggests several mean-
ings of ambiguity---contradiction, lack of information, and 
variability being the most common. Each of these can clearly 
be seen in the various studies reported here. Most treat 
ambiguity as a stimulus variable involving some form or con-
tradiction or lack ot information, Some others treat it as 
a st1nl.llua variable which can only be measured by response 
patterns. But "response ambiguity" can also be cited (66), 
8 
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as can response stability in the form of behavioral rigidity 
(23, 46, 64). In fact, it may well be that a number of the 
contradictory findings relating to intolerance or ambiguity 
can be attributed to the conceptual contradictions in 
Frenkel-Brunswik's otherwise stimulating and provocative 
formulations (see, tor examples or contradictory findin&s, 
12 and 50, 20 and 62, 34 and 48). 
4. One other maJor locus ot contusion exists, although in 
this case it may have a more symptomatic than causal rela-
tionship to the conceptual contusion being considered here. 
Along with the many studies specifically employing the term 
ambiguity, there are many (including some already covered) 
not readily distinguishable from the former except that they 
have employed different terms for essentially the same 
phenomenon. Generally, these studies have had the same 
goals, have employed similar experimental devices and reason-
ing, and have used similar measurements or the ambiguous ele-
ments. Therefore, they can easily be subsumed under the 
same general heading of studies in ambiguity, though they 
use terms such as structure (22, 49, 64), incongruence (1, 
68), clarity (49), incongruity (15), noise (41, 42), the un-
familiar (30), fluctuation (33), contusion and unpatterned 
(35), uncertainty (10, 57), and many others. The English 
language is shot through with these and other terms which 
describe essentially the same phenomenon, and the tendency 
among researchers has been to use them all, rather than to 
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seek a common and/or consistent denotation. The overall 
effect is merely to add confusion to what is clearly the 
very epitome of ambiguity, however defined. 
We shall look now at two possible means of resolving the 
confusion which has been documented above. The first of 
these involves an analysis of the informational content of 
ambiguous materials. As will be seen, this analysis leads 
to the formulation of an assumption which in turn leads to 
a second conception of ambiguity, employing its net effects 
on the individual--effects which suggest rather clearly that 
"ambiguous" can be taken to mean "conflict arousing." 
One approach to clarifying the present status of ambigu-
ity is to perform a kind of content analysis of selected 
aspects of the work reported 1n the literature. Different 
investigators may of course come up with different sorts of 
categorizations, the legitimacy of each resultant typology 
being judged by its ow.n goals and utility for those goals. 
Our goal at this point is merely to see if ambiguous stimuli 
per ~ can be categorized regardless of other factors such 
as response variables, experimental contexts, or validity 
of associated empirical findings. Probably the simplest 
means of doing this is to concentrate on the nature of the 
information to be found in situations termed ambiguous. In 
spite of the apparent looseness of this procedure, three 
somewhat separable "types" of ambiguity emerge. They are 
not mutually exclusive, nor can it be claimed that they are 
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completely exhaustive of the possibilities inherent in the 
reported work on ambiguity, but they do seem to stand out 
rather clearly. The second typology to be reported below 
can be seen as further breakdown of the trichotomy used here. 
Type I: Lack of information. Here the nature of the 
stimulus is such that the individual cannot find informational 
cues relevant to his task (Bruner prefers the term "clue" to 
the more traditional "cue," presumably to emphasize the trans-
actional nature of the perceptual process). We have in mind 
here, for instance, the autokinetic effect (8, 56, 62) where 
cues about the movement of light arise solely from processes 
internal to the perceiving individual until, as is often the 
case, another subject--or a stooge--makes an independent 
estimate. Brim (9) has used a task requiring subjects to 
estimate the liklihood of factors on which they have no ob-
jective data. Smith (60) studied the effects on productivity 
and satisfaction of "ambiguous role expectations" where the 
latter was induced through the presence of a silent group 
member. Kohn and Williams (35) studied situations in which 
the actors who were faced with a new situation demanding 
action had no previous experience from which to derive direc-
tion. 
Type II: Over information. Here ambiguity consists 
of a number of cues relevant to two or generally more possi-
ble alternatives, such that a one-to-one relationship between 
11 
cue and alternative is difficult to perceive. For example, 
the Rorschach contains a limitless supply of cues to a 
similarly limitless number of alternatives. Martin (43) re-
quested subjects to arrange the Vigotsky blocks; there are, 
of course, several ways to attempt this grouping, depending 
on the cues one employs. Smock (61) used a series of con-
figurations shifting from practically cueless to completely 
structured!'orm, with the subjects being given a list of 
alternatives from which to select the correct percept. Macy 
and his colleagues (28, 41, 42) have used mottled marbles 
which could each be identified as belonging to several pre-
viously learned color categories. 
Type III: Contradictory information. This is perhaps the 
most dis tine ti ve kind of ambiguity category. Here the s timu-
lus cues either are themselves contradictory as to the alter-
natives to which they refer, or they refer to incompatible 
alternatives. Zaleznik, et !l· (68), and Adams (1) looked 
at "status incongruency" by which is meant the degree to 
which various factors leading to the proscribed ~tatus of a 
person are "out of line" with each other. Davids (20) asked 
his subjects to recall "contradictory and conflicting" state-
menta. Jones' (33) use of classical reversible figures to 
study "intolerance of fluctuation" and Bruner and Postman's 
(15) use of red spade and black heart playing cards to study 
perceptual reactions to incongruity illustrate situations 
with incompatible alternatives. 
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Briefly then, by concentrating on the informational con-
tent of stimuli which have been termed ambiguous one arrives 
at a trichotomy where information may be lacking, contra-
dictory, or of uncertain relevance to available alternatives. 
A somewhat different categorization results from a logical 
analysis of the perceptual process as a whole. Let us, for 
the moment, adopt a very simple conception of the perceptual 
process as consisting of the "fitting" or transaction of two 
separable constructs, cue and category, to use Bruner's terms. 
Seen this way, veridical perception consists of the stimulus 
cue "matching" the proper category within an individual's 
perceptual model system. Applying to this conception the 
trichotomy spelled out above yields a dishearteningly long 
list of possible meanings of, or means of inducing, ambigu-
ity: 
a. Stimuli with no informational value 
b. Stimuli with too many cues 
c. Stimuli with contradictory cues 
d. No alternatives specifiable 
e. Many alternatives specifiable 
f. Incompatible alternatives 
g. No cues, no alternatives specified 
h. Too many cues and alternatives to permit matching 
13 
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APPROACHES TO CLARIFICATION 
We need not dwell on such a listing at length, except to 
point out that with such an array of possible kinds of am-
biguous situations it becomes increasingly important to take 
a stand on the core attributes of ambiguity. For the moment, 
this is about as far as one can go in analyzing the informa-
tional content of ambiguity. However, if we turn away from 
this approach, several other choices of approach are possible. 
One can drop the term completely as being more confusing 
than helpful, and as masking potentially important distinc-
tiona. One can, on some semi-arbitrary basis, limit the use 
of the term to some segment of the total possibilities and 
thence-forward be able to specify the exact referent of the 
concept. Unfortunately, this might merely add to an already 
sizeable list of such delimited conceptions now in the liter-
ature. 
One can, alternatively, attempt to distill from existing 
conceptions a common core which would then be the "essence" 
of ambiguity. As one peruses the literature on ambiguity, 
he is hard put to find such a common core. Certainly noth-
ing is stated explicitly. What is it then which might be 
used to tie the various conceptions together? 
Two major possibilities seem to exist. The first takes 
the form, not of a specification of the stimulus properties 
14 
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themselves, but of an assumption which may be seen to under-
lie most, if not all, conceptions of ambiguity. This is not 
an assumption necessarily held by the various writers in this 
area, but rather one which may have to be made in order to 
justify the legitimacy of employing such a large variety of 
operations for inducing or measuring ambiguity. This assump-
tion could be phrased in several ways, but it amounts to 
something like this: 
The type of ambiguity induced into a situation, or the 
means taken to measure ambiguity or establish its pres-
ence, is relatively unimportant, for ambiguity--no 
matter how induced, measured, or demonstrated--will 
lead to the same result. This is that an individual 
in a completely ambiguous setting will be unable to 
perceive, choose, or act (each being, as Bruner points 
out, a decision process, broadly conceived) solely on 
the basis of information residing within the present-
ing stimulus. It follows from this that the most 
direct measure of degree of ambiguity must be a re-
sponse measure, such that the greater ability to per-
ceive, choose, or act is indicative of decreased am-
biguity. 
Whether this assumption is tenable or not is a question an-
swerable only by empirical test. It may well be that, con-
trary to the assumption, different "kinds" of ambiguity will 
result in different behavioral or perceptual consequences of 
either a quantitative or qualitative nature. These conse-
quences may be in terms of task performance, internal states, 
or modes of ambiguity resolution (or, to follow Luchins, 
structurizations). 
It should be noted, in addition, that ambiguity refers 
to more than the direct stimulus 1n a controlled situation. 
15 
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It must, in fact, refer to any and all aspects of the situa-
tion which are relevant to the action of the individual. As 
examples of this, Sherif and Harvey (57), in studying re-
sponse patterns and norms in the autokinetic setting, induced 
three degrees of ambiguity in the general experimental set-
ting by varying the amount of information about the spatial 
arrangements in the darkened experimental room. Raven and 
Rietsema (49) gave their subjects some very specific tasks 
to perform, but induced ambiguity with respect to the goals 
of the tasks. Smith (60) showed that the introduction of a 
silent member (as a source of ambiguity) into a group lowered 
productivity and satisfaction, and raised defensiveness among 
the other group members. In each of these cases, the induced 
ambiguity was not in the primary stimulus for the subjects, 
and yet behavior was affected by it. 
There is a second way of resolving some of the confusion 
surrounding ambiguity, and that involves investigating the 
possibility that another concept, theory, or set of proposi-
tions already firmly established may be able to handle the 
same phenomena with which ambiguity has been concerned. 
Several writers have explicitly suggested that the perception 
of ambiguity may be subsumable under the better formulated 
rubric of conflict theory. Indeed, the assumption cited 
above sounds very much like a statement of the general nature 
of conflict. Before we turn to this suggestion, the investi-
gation of which will constitute the bulk of this study, let 
16 
us clarify our position concerning our approach to perception 
generally, and the perception of ambiguity as a sub-case of 
general perceptual processes. 
THE PERCEPTUAL PROCESS 
The approach to be taken here is best represented by 
Bruner's general model (14). Briefly, perception amounts to 
an act of categorization, in which stimulus inputs are "coded" 
into available categories within the perceiver's perceptual 
system on the basis of their categorial cues. This is seen 
as analogous to a decision process, or series of such, in 
which inferences are made on the basis of the cue-value of 
the input, the category specifications, and the perceiver's 
general experience with the class of objects involved. 
Bruner suggests that veridical perception can be broken down 
into tour major stages: 
1. Primitive categorization, in which the object con-
cerned is separated from its surrounding context. 
2. Cue search, in which the object is further attended 
to for the selection of criterial attributes with 
categorial reference--the object is initially identi-
fied as belonging to a given class of objects. 
3. Confirmation check, in which focus is narrowed, 
through a "gating" process, and further cues serve 
to reinforce the original coding. 
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4. Confirmation completion, in which the organism be-
comes satisfied with the "match" or "fit" between 
cues and category. 
This is, of course, a model of perception rather than an ex-
planation or a neurophysiological process. But Bruner states, 
I would propose that perceptual learning consists not 
of making finer and finer discriminations as the Gib-
sons would have us believe, but it consists rather in 
the learning of appropriate modes of coding the environ-
ment in terms of ita object character, connectedness, 
or redundancy, and then in allocating stimulus inputs 
to appropriate categorial coding systems. 
The result of this process, over time, is the acquisition of 
a sense of probabilities concerning the matching of cues and 
categories. Therefore, if one is to analyze any given per-
ceptual event, he must look at the nature of the cues, the 
nature of the categories, and the factors affecting the 
matching process or probability levels of cue-category 
identity. On the cue aide, Bruner concentrates on "group-
ing and integration" as dependent upon, or characterized by 
the learned probabilities of events. On the other end of 
the process, categories are ordered on "accessibility," or 
the salience of a given category at the time of stimulation. 
The transactional nature of the process is handled by a 
"match-mismatch" process and by "gating," both of which 
evaluate for the perceiver the degree to which cues fit in-
to accessible categories, and guide the perceiver further to-
warda veridical perception. 
18 
The Conflict HYPothesis: In summing up an approach to 
the thorny problem of "perceptual defense," Bruner presents 
in the same article a proposition that would seem to apply 
equally well to the perception of ambiguity; ". • that 
failure to perceive is most often not a ~ of perceiving 
but a matter of interference with perceiving." Elsewhere, 
he states that "Accessibility, then, must have something to 
do with the resolution of competing alternatives," and 
in n aga , • • • given a sensory input with equally good fit to 
two non-overlapping categories, the more aecessible of the 
two categories would 'capture' the input." 
These statements apply well to the perception of ambigu-
ity as we have seen the term employed, but they also smack 
of classical propositions drawn from conflict theory. These 
conceptions are clearly exemplified in Bruner and Postman's 
study on the perception of incongruity, where reactions to 
incongruous stimuli (red spades, black hearts) are similar to 
standard approaches to conflict resolution. It has already 
been pointed out that a number of studies (1, 15, 20, 33, 68) 
on ambiguity have induced the latter through the introduction 
of conflicting or contradictory cues or incompatible alterna-
tives. In particular, Siegel's study (59)--a direct takeoff 
from Frenkel-Brunswik's conception--involved an explanatory 
model which led from psychodynamic conflict to anxiety to a 
rejection of ambiguity to effects on several dependent vari-
ables. Consequently, the central question at this point is 
19 
whether all ambiguity can be handled through con£lict theory, 
If the answer is yes, an extrapolation £rom Bruner would sug-
gest that the core principle involved is that of interfering 
responses set in motion by the stimulus as it fits or does 
not fit with accessible categories. 
Strong support for the notion of ambiguity as primarily 
a function of interfering responses comes from Berlyne. In 
an article concerned with finding common ground between in-
formation theory and conflict theory (7), he is speaking of 
curiosity and exploratory behavior: 
A relatively novel stimulus pattern is one in which 
perception con£licts with the expectations aroused by 
the context. Moreover, at least as far as human beings 
are concerned, any absolutely novel object is bound 
to consist of an un£amiliar combination of familiar 
elements or to possess characteristics intermediate be-
tween those of several well-known objects. Such an ob-ject can be expected to induce conflict, since it will 
inevitably invoke, by generalization, responses appro-
priate to a number of discrepant familiar objects. 
Other words (similar to this] are 'doubt', 'per-
plexity' and 'ambiguity.' These words likewise imply 
some degree of behavioral con£lict; they indicate that 
different aspects of a situation evoke discordant reac-
tions, or else that a particular reaction is called forth 
by one aspect and inhibited by another. They are 
opposite in meaning to words like 'clear' and 'distinct' 
which generally imply that certain response tendencies 
have come, through discriminatory learning, to predomi-
nateover their competitors. 'Doubtful, 1 'perplexing,' 
or 'ambiguous' stimulus situations are usually also cases 
of high 'uncertainty' in the information theory sense, 
both because the subject cannot predict very success-
fully what the future behavior or the hidden properties 
of the entities will be, and because observers will not 
be able to predict very successfully how he will react 
to them. 
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Berlyne also cites evidence that more "complex" or "less re-
dWldant" stimuli (ambiguous stimuli) lead "like figures arous-
ing conflict in other ways" to more investigatory behavior 
(cue search). If Berlyne and Bruner are correct in their 
suggestion that the effects of ambiguity are those of con-
flict generally, a test of this hypothesis should involve 
predictions about reactions to ambiguity derived from con-
flict theory. What form should such predictions take? 
Berlyne suggest (6, 7) indirectly a mode of approaching 
this question, through propositions concerning degree of con-
flict. Drawing from his own work as well as that of others, 
he suggests that degree of conflict is: 
••• an increasing fWlction of four antecedent variables, 
namely, (1) the number of competing response tendencies, 
(2) their absolute strengths, (3) the degree to which 
their strengths approach equality, and (4) their degree 
of incompatibility or antagonism. 
One can trasnlate these four factors into Bruner's language 
without Wldue difficulty. The first refers to the number of 
accessible categories to which cues apply; the second refers 
to an aspect of the accessibility of the categories and/or 
the learned cue-category probabilities; the third is a re-
statement of the second where several categories are involved; 
the fourth is a refinement of the third wherein incompatible 
but equally accessible categories are referred to by a cue 
with equal probability relationships to both. 
Taking reaction time as a major and common dependent 
variable of conflict, Berlyne cites evidence supporting the 
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first and third factors as determinants of reaction time; 
i.e., the number of competing response tendencies (or accessi-
ble categories) and the degree to which their strengths 
approach equality (equality or accessibility) are determ1-
nantsor reaction time, greater number and greater equality 
leading to increased response delay. Berlyne's own experi-
ments confirm these findings, and in addition show the sec-
ond factor--absolute strengths of competing response tend-
encies--to stand in the same relationship to reaction time 
as the first and third. On the last, he finds his own data 
to be equivocal, and concludes that at least physiological 
incompatibility is not related. He cites evidence from other 
sources, however, which suggest that acquired incompatibility 
of response tendencies is related to reaction time. 
Support for the first three propositions in particular is 
abundant in the psychological literature. On the effects of 
varying the equality of strengths one can cite Sears and 
Hovland (55), Barker (4), Brown and Farber (11), Miller (45), 
and Shipley, et al. (58) • Barker, and Brown and Farber along 
with HYman (32), who in turn cites studies by Merkel and by 
Hick (29), provide support for the absolute strengths proposi-
tion, while at the same time Hyman, Hick, and Barker and 
Elliott (3), and Woodworth (67) have shown the effects due to 
the number of response alternatives. It is clear from the 
overlapping in these citations that these propositions stated 
by Berlyne fall together quite readily in the minds of past 
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investigators. Another point ot interest is that while most 
of the above work is traceable to strict behavior theory as 
exemplified by the work ot Hull, Barker has come to the same 
logical and empirical conclusions while working out of a 
Lewinian framework. 
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CHAPTER II: THE PROBLEM, HYPOTHESES 1 
AND DESIGN 
PROBLEM 
The foregoing leaves us with some fairly clear guide 
linea. In order to investigate the applicability of con-
flict theory to the perception of ambiguity, several things 
are required: 
l. A translation of the factors cited by Berlyne into 
corresponding perceptual or decision processes. 1 
2. A means of inducing these factors into what have 
been up to now called ambiguous stimuli. 
3. Selection of appropriate dependent variables. 
The decision on this third point is the simplest. Berlyne 
specifically points out the demonstrated relationship between 
conflict and reaction time as follows: 
A lengthening of reaction time (or decision time or 
choice time) has often been reported as a consequence of 
conflict •••• Mean reaction time has been found to in-
crease when alternative stimuli approach equiprobability 
and when they become more numerous. If ... the number 
of competiilg response tendencies corresponds to the num-
ber ot alternative stimuli, and if the relative strengths 
ot these tendencies reflect the probabilities of the 
1. It should be made clear at this point that we are not 
testing these propositions about conflict theory, but 
"borrowing" them for application to a related area or 
concern. 
24 
corresponding stimuli, we can infer that two of the 
suggested determinants of C [conflict] affect reaction 
time. 
The reader is asked to note in the above quotation that re-
action time is equated with decision time or choice time. 
There is of course some question as to whether these can 
properly be equated, and the answer must eventually be de-
cided empirically. The studies cited at the end of Chapter 
I in support of Berlyne's propositions have used all three 
ideas. In fact, one of the critical Berlyne articles (6) 
is entitled "Conflict and Choice 'l'ime" even though the vari-
able measured is the standard RT (reaction time--or sometimes, 
more generally, response time). Reaction time is best dis-
tinguished from the others by the instruction set preceding 
it to "respond as quickly as possible." Whether the forcing 
of immediate reactions is an important factor in relating 
conflict variables to response time is a question which must 
await further research. 
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that the 
propositions being employed in the present study have else-
where been demonstrated to hold for responses unforced in 
time. This is particularly important in the present study, 
because we are attempting here to apply the conflict proposi-
tions to the perception of ambiguity, in which the classical 
dependent varaible is some form of ambiguity resolution, a 
decision process, broadly conceived. Speed of achieving 
closure and speed of norm formation are two examples of time 
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measures of resolution in which initial reaction time is sub-
ordinate in importance to the final decision process. Thus, 
in this present attempt to handle the perception of ambiguity 
in conflict terms, the major dependent variable will be ~ 
to final decision (percept). In addition, the experimental 
design will permit the investigation of something closer to 
the usual meaning of reaction time, namely, time to first 
guess. 
HYPOTHESES 
HYPothesis #1: One of the most common operations for de-
fining stimulus ambiguity has been the number of different 
responses elicited by the stimulus. Therefore, Berlyne 1 s 
first factor, the number of competing response tendencies, 
will be introduced as an independent variable. It is h1PO•h-
esized that a stimulus which evokes a greater number of 
competing response tendencies will lead to greater delay in 
final decision than one which evokes a smaller number of com-
peting response tendencies. In the present experiment this 
means that subjects given more alternatives from which to 
choose will take longer to recognize a stimulus than those 
whose choices are more restricted. 
HYPothesis #2: Luch1ns ( 40) has stated a preference for 
considering ambiguity as defined by the number of responses 
possible regardless of their strengths. In the hope of 
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discarding this, the proposition concerning absolute strengths 
of competing response tendencies will be employed here. It 
is hypothesized that the greater the absolute strengths of 
the competing response tendencies, the greater will be the 
delay in decision time. This will be tested by the predic-
tion that subjects will take longer to recognize a stimulus 
when the response choices have already been reinforced than 
when they have not been reinforced. 
Hypothesis #3: A third factor cited by Berlyne, the 
equality of strength of the competing response tendencies, 
causes some trouble. In Berlyne's experiment, immediate 
choice reaction time was the primary focus, and there was 
little concern for the correctness of the response. However, 
in the design to be used here, in which subjects have ample 
opportunity to Judge their own correctness as the correct 
stimulus slowly emerges into view, the situation is compli-
cated. Because we are concerned here with time to final 
decision, the response may be a function of both the equality 
of strength of the competing response tendencies ~ of a 
feedback process due to the fact that each response is follow-
ed by a clearer stimulus. Thus there is no opportunity to 
apply the equality proposition as stated, but there is an 
opportunity to refine it for those situations in which the 
perceiver has a chance to judge the correctness of his re-
sponse. In this situation there are three combinations of 
equality and correct stimulus: when the correct stimulus 
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(among several alternatives available) is of lesser, equal, 
or greater strength than the alternative stimuli. It is 
hypothesized that decision time will be slower when the cor-
rect response tendency is of lower strength, faster when 
the correct response tendency is of equal strength, and 
fastest when the correct response tendency is of greater 
strength than the other competing response tendencies, This 
is little more than a statement of "set," indicating that 
the correct alternatives will be identified sooner or later 
as a function of the probabilities associated with them. 
Hypothesis #4: Since a good deal of the work on ambigu-
ity has stemmed from Frenkel-Brunswik's formulations coming 
from the work on the authoritarian personality, it was 
deemed advisable to investigate the relationship between the 
above factors and scores on the F scale. More specifically, 
high authoritarians are said to have greater difficulty 
than low authoritarians in handling conflict. In the present 
experiment this should manifest itself in two ways: high 
authoritarians should manlteat a slower decision time than low 
authoritarians, and this should be particularly true where 
degree of conflict is greatest. Therefore hypothesis 4(a) 
states that decision time will be greater for high authori-
tarians than low authoritarians. Hypotheses 4(b)# (c), and 
(d) state that the relationships predicted in hypotheses 1, 
2, and 3 should be more proDounced among high authoritarians 
than among low authoritarians (i.e., it is hypothesized 
that a high P-low P comparison will accentuate the _differ-
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ences due to the number of competing response tendencies 
{#4b), their absolute strengths {#4c) and the equality of 
strengths {#4d). 
These hypotheses do not enjoy the same status, so far as 
the aims of this study are concerned. The first two--con-
cerning the number and the absolute strengths or competing 
response tendencies--are of primary importance, being direct 
applications of the conflict approach to the perception of 
ambiguity. The third hypothesis is merely an attempt to 
show the need for modifYing the statement about equality of 
strengths for those cases in which subjects obtain feedback; 
i.e., when immediate ambiguity resolution is secondary to 
veridical perception. The remaining hypotheses, concerned 
with predictions from authoritarianism, are clearly secondary 
in importance, and have been introduced in the hope that the 
results might help to refine statements concerning the major 
concerns above, and that the study might more clearly be re-
lated to other findings in the literature. 
DESIGN 
Task: The task adopted for the study is modeled general-
ly on that of Smock (61), used in his study demonstrating 
that induced stress or anxiety can raise an individual's in-
tolerance of ambiguity. Smock's subjects were presented with 
five series of cards, each series containing fifteen configura-
tions. The first card in each series contained just a few 
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dots, but on each successive card a few more were added until, 
on the 15th and last card a perfectly clear picture was pre-
sented. The subjects were instructed to predict as soon as 
possible what the final picture would be. For this purpose 
they were given a list of alternatives, one of which they 
were told would be the correct choice. 2 
The task used here is a more complex version of the Smock 
task. There are four series, each with fourteen cards pre-
sented serially, from the least clear to the most clear. 
Each image is actually made up of four components, as opposed 
to the unitary image used by Smock. Series one contains, 
on each card, the heads of a horse, cow, goat, and dog; series 
two features geometric figures best labeled hexagon, tire, 
snowflake, and screwnut; series three has the numbers 2, 3, 
4, and 9; series four consists of a heterogeneous group--
church, candlestick, key, and flask.3 
The four components are placed in a horizontal row on 
each 9" x 11" card, and each card is manually exposed to the 
subject for seven seconds, with thirteen seconds between each 
card. With 14 cards in each series comprising one trial, 
2. The use of a graduated series of images as ambiguous 
stimuli is quite common, a fact which gives theoretical 
backing to the use of the present task as typical of 
what have been called ambiguous stimuli (see, for example, 
25, 37, 39, 52). 
3. See Appendix A for a description of the mode of construct-
ing the stimuli. 
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each trial lasted exactly four minutes and 27 seconds. Each 
subject first went through two trial series to familiarize 
him with the procedure. The first of these had five cards 
featuring the letters B, D, E, and F. The second was a seven-
card series picturing an orange, apple, pear, and lemon. 
Independent variables: (a) Assuming, with Berlyne (see 
page 24), that the number of competing response tendencies 
is related to the number of stimuli in the subject's per-
ceptual field, two variations on this variable were induced 
as follows. It will be remembered that each stimulus card 
in a series contains four components in a horizontal line, 
This was done in order that variations in these orders 
could be employed. Thus, each stimulus in a series contained 
exactly the same elements, but in different orders. For ex-
ample, in series #1 the following four alternatives were 
constructed according to a latin square design: 
alternative 1: 
alternative 2: 
al terna ti ve 3 .
1
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alternative 4 
horse, dog, cow, goat 
cow, horse, goat, dog 
dog, goat, horse, cow 
goat, cow, dog, horse 
The two variations on number of competing response tend-
encies were induced by showing subjects in the four-alterna-
tive condition all four alternative orders, and by showing 
subjects in the two-alternative condition only two of the 
alternative orders. For example, a subject in the four-al-
ternative condition would have to choose between all four of 
the above possibilities, while in the two-alternative condi-
tion only two of these choices would be available to him. 
In each case, S was to decide which of the available alterna-
tives was correct. The alternatives offered and the combina-
tions thereof, the order in which they were set before S, and 
the determination of the correct alternative were all system-
atically varied. Fifty-six subjects were used here. 
(b) The absolute strengths of competing response tend-
encies were varied in two ways. This was done in the two-
equal-alternative condition. Thirty-two subjects of those 
already mentioned were matched (according to scores on the F 
scale) with thirty-two other subjects for this purpose. 
These latter thirty-two went through all other experimental 
conditions as well, but their data were used only for this 
particular test. Half of each were assigned to the "Stronger" 
condition and half to the "Weaker" condition. Each S went 
through five trials (five aeries of 14 cards each) in this 
condition. In the "Stronger" condition, the correct stimulus 
in the 5th and critical trial was one of those which had al-
ready been correct, while in the "Weaker" condition this was 
not so. In other words, in the "Stronger" condition, the 
absolute strengths of the competing response tendencies were 
increased by trial 5 by using the two alternatives which 
proved to be correct in the first four trials. In the "Weak-
er" condition this was not the case--the alternatives avail-
able in trial 5 had not previously been correct. This can 
best be illustrated in the design sketched below. As can be 
seen, in the'Stronge~ conditionS must choose between two 
alternatives which have already been correct (A and C)--the 
two competing response tendencies have been reinforced, Just 
the opposite is the case in the''weaker"condition, The 
choices (B and D) in the critical trial 5 have not previously 
been reinforced. The conflict here is presumably less in-
tense, 
Stro~er Weaker 
Trial l ~ ® c D -® ® ~ D Trial 2 {; B @ @ A B @ Trial 3 ® c D ,/® ®.;_ D 
Trial 4 A B '@ @ A B ~ @ 
Trial 5 '® B t) D A "'® c @ 
Exp;J.anation: Each letter represents an alternative. 
Circled letters are those from which S may choose in 
each trial. Checked letters are the correct alterna-
tives. The above is merely an outline. In the ex-
periment, the alternatives presented and the assign-
ment of correct alternatives were varied systemati-
cally. 
(c) Equality of strengths of the competing response 
tendencies appeared in three varieties. In the "equal" 
condition, S was told that each alternative (whether there 
were two or four of these) was equally likely to occur 
(be correct). In the "unequal more probable" condition, 
the probabilities of occurrence were stated as being 
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unequal, and the greater probability was assigned by E to 
the alternative which would eventually be correct. In the 
"unequal less probable" condition, S was told that the 
probabilities were unequal, and the greater probabilities 
were assigned by E to the incorrect alternatives. In the 
two-unequal-alternative condition the probabilities were 
set at 3 to 1 or 1 to 3. In the four-unequal-alternative 
condition, the ratios were 3 to 1 to 1 to 1, or 1 to 3 to 
3 to 3, with the odd figure assigned to the correct alterna-
tives. These inductions were hopefully reinforced in two 
practice trials preceding the experiment proper, in each 
of which the correct alternative was assigned the greater 
probability. The thought here was that this would in-
crease the credibility of this aspect of the instructions. 
The same fifty-six subjects were assigned to one of these 
three conditions as were used to test the number-of-alterna-
tives hypothesis. 
The final independent variable in this study is author-
itarianism, as measured by Form 40-45 of the F scale. 
There are several methodological criticisms and uncertain-
ties associated with this form of the F scale which have 
led to attempts at revision and modification by later 
writers. These include a lack of unidimensionality, the 
problem of response set, and the use of relatively un-
stable undergraduate samples in a good deal of the follow-
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up studies. The response set problem has received particu-
larly close attention, most notably by Christie and his 
associates (17, 19) who indicate that response set plays 
less or a role in authoritarianism than earlier studies 
had indicated. Rokeach (51) reaches the same conclusion 
in a more indirect fashion. The reader is referred to 
these articles, and to ayman and Sheatsley (31) tor com-
prehensive critiques or the F scale. In spite or the 
possible faults associated with Form 40-45, it was decided 
to use it because or its more direct connection with 
Frenkel-Brunswik's original conceptions of the dynamic proe-
eeses underlying authoritarianism, i.e., the emotional 
conflicts which are said to lead to the authoritarian syn-
drome and its attendant perceptual counterparts. Since 
Hyman and Sheatsley demonstrate clearly that the theory is 
not well supported by Adorno, et !l· (2), it was hoped that 
the present attempt with its direct emphasis on conflict 
factors might shed added light on the hypothesized con-
flict base or authoritarianism. 
The scales were administered in S's class, and selection 
of subjects was based on the scores obtained. Figure I 
presents the distribution or F scale scores obtained from 
the subjects' classes, while Figure II presents the dis-
tribution among the 88 subjects who took part in the experi-
ment. The scores are based on the use of a +l to +7 
scoring system applied to Form 40-45 or the F scale as 
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reported by Adorno, ll al. The scores reported in Figures 
I and II are derived by adding up each s•s points, and 
dividing by the number of items, 29, yielding a mean score 
per item. A low score corresponds to low authoritarianism. 
Comparison of the distribution in Figure I with the 
data reported in Adorno, et al., indicates that this group 
of undergraduate students 1B somewhat less authoritarian. 
Data taken by the originators of the F scale from 14 varied 
populations yield an unweighted mean on Form 40-45 of 3.84 
and a ~ of l.lO. In fact, the mean of our scores is lower 
than that of any of the 14 groups studied by the authors 
of The Authoritarian Personality. The average reliability 
reported by Adorno, ll _!!.. 1 is • 90, and in the present 
study it is .86, using an odd-evan split half approach 
corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula. 
The running of the experiment was almost concurrent 
with the volunteering of subjects. Thus it was impossible 
to have the matching of high and low F S's on the basis of 
complete F data. However, preliminary analysis indicated 
an overall median of about 3.22, and it was decided to use 
this point as the criterion for calling subjects high or 
low F. In addition, using this median as a criterion, 
the mean Low F score in all classes from which S's were 
drawn was 2.61, while the mean of the High F 1 s was 4.04, 
the overall difference being 1.43. In the selection of 
S 1s it was decided to match high and low F S's by the score 
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difference of this amount (1.43). That is, for each high 
F subject in a given condition, an attempt was made to 
have a low F subject whose F score was 1.43 points lower. 
Although the self-selective nature of using volunteers 
made it impossible to do this perfectly, the final mean 
of Low F subjects was 2.51, and the mean of High F subjects 
was 4.05, yielding a difference of 1.54, which is approxi-
mately equal to twice the standard deviation of the scores 
in Figure I, and very close to the desired difference of 
1.43. 
The design of this experiment can be perhaps best under-
stood by a pictorial representations, as set up below in 
Figures III and rv. It is not possible in this picture to 
indicate all the controls introduced in this study, but 
they include the following: 
l. Subjects l and 29, 2 and 30, and so on through all 
cases are separated by approximately 1.54 points on 
the F scale, equal to twice the ~of the total original 
distribution from which S's were drawn. It was felt 
that this much separation between high and low F sub-
jects would be sufficient to test the effects attribut-
able to authoritarianism. 
2. In each cell, the task series, the four alterna-
tives of each, and the assignment of the correct al-
ternative are all e~ated through systematic variation 
across subjects. 
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3. No alternative is correct more orten than another, 
nor is any one alternative more often the "more prob-
able" or "less probable" one in the Wlequal conditions. 
4. The order of the series, the order of the treat-
ments, and the combination of these for each subject is 
systematically varied over all subjects. 
All of these controls were achieved through the employment 
of a number of Graeco-Latin Squares superimposed upon each 
other. To the best of E1 s knowledge, there are no system-
atic biases in the occurrence and sequences of the factors 
to be controlled. Thus the findings to be reported cannot 
be attributed to systematic bias in the order in which sub-
jects go through the experimental conditions, nor the order 
in which they are given the four task series, nor the order 
of the four components in each stimulus card, nor the deter-
mination of the correct alternative, nor Wlequal matching 
by F scores, nor any combination of the above. 
Each subject in Figure III appears in four of the con-
ditions: 2 equal and 4 equal, and two of the other four 
cells, one ot which is with two alternatives and one with 
four alternatives. This Wlusual design is due to the "more" 
and "less probable" variations in the Wlequal strengths con-
ditions--a situation not forseen in Berlyne•s work. The 
distinguishing feature here in the assignment of subjects is 
that the fourteen subjects in any of the unequal strengths 
cells are split seven and seven in the other two cells open 
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to them. For instance, all high F subjects ~all into cells 
A and B, but hal~ o~ them ~all into C and hal~ into E. In 
addition, half of those in cell C are also in cell D, and 
hal~ are in cell F, and so on. 
Figure IV: Pictorial Representation o~ Experimental 
Design--Authoritarianism and Absolute Strengths 
(Trial 5 only in the Expanded 2-Egual-
Alternative Condition) 
1! Scores 
High Low 
§fL. §fL. 
l i~ 29 45 2 30 46 
"Stronger" 
3 19 31 ~~ 4 20 32 
5 21 33 49 6 22 34 so 
A ~~ 35 51 36 52 
§fL. * §fL. * 
.xl .xl7 x29 x45 
x2 .xl8 x30 x46 
"Weaker" ~~ .xl9 x31 ~~ x20 x32 xs x21 x33 x49 
x6 .x22 x34 xso 
~A x23 x35 xSl x24 x36 x52 
*These are the 32 extra subjects used only in this 
analysis. 
Not all subjects were used in the teat of the absolute 
strengths hypothesis. Sixteen or the high F and sixteen or 
the low F subjects were used in the "stronger" (reinforced) 
condition, and were matched by a like nwuber in the "weaker" 
(non-reinforced) condition whose F scores were matched with 
those in the "stronger" condition. Thus, this is a matched-
pairs design. Sixteen per cell was the nwuber needed to 
achieve the necessary controls in the use of the tour tasks, 
al terna ti vee, etc • (see pp. 39-4o) • 
The time plan of the experiment--the steps to be follow-
ed by each subject--can beat be understood by reading the in-
structions tor the subjects, as follows: 
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This experiment is concerned with visual perception--
that is, how one comes to see and recognize the things 
around him. In this particular experiment we are not 
concerned with testing your perceptual skill, but 
• 
rather we are using you--and people like you--to get a 
general picture of the clarity of the stimuli or images 
you're going to see. The idea is to see at what point 
different kinds or images become clear. * 
You're going to see (4, 8) series ot images. In 
each aeries I'm going to present 14 cards, one at a 
time, and each succeeding card will contain more infor-
mation--give a clearer picture--of what the correct 
image will be. In other words, the question is really 
how much does one need to see of a visual object in 
order tor it to be-co-rrectly identified. 
I'm going to give you two short practice runs first 
so you can see how all this works out, and then we'll 
go to the regular tasks. Your job in each case will be 
to predict the final correct image on the basis ot what 
you will see, and what I tell you about what you're 
likely to see. There will be some variations in what 
you 1 :re told about each "'?'"'the tasks • 
8 tor those S'a used to test the abolute strength hypo-
thesis, 4 tor the other s•s. 
As I said, each task consists of 14 cards which 
get more and more clear as we go on. Somewhere between 
the lst and 14th card you'll be able to predict what 
the correct stimulus is. Now I don't want you to guess 
wildly, nor hold off indefinitely. You probably won't 
be able to tell much from the let card--if you guess 
too early, you may well guess wrong. On the other 
nand you probably won't have to wait 'til the 14th card. 
Try to decide what it is when you think you have a 
reasonable chance of being right. You'll have to judge 
this for yourself. Also, I'm not going to say if you're 
right or wrong--we'll go through all 14 cards regard-
less. Incidentally, if you make a guess along the line, 
and then on a later card you want to change your mind, 
go right ahead and change. This may happen quite often. 
Now take a look at that switch box in front of you. 
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Those five switches will be used to indicate your re-
sponse. The lst one on the left should be flipped down 
whenever you prefer not to guess. The others will give 
you a choice of guesses. The switchbox is connected to 
this panel so I can record which switch you use. You 
will flip one--and only one--or the switches after each 
card is shown to you. Right now it is set up for a 
practice run. In this practice run the correct image 
will be either FBPE, BEFP, EPBP, or PFEB--that is, one of 
those four series of letters will emerge. Here's what 
the letters will look like individually. Your job is 
to see in which order they appear. I can tell you this 
much about this first example; as things have been set 
up, out of every six people in this experiment, one will 
be shown the first series, three will be shown the sec-
ond, one the third and one the fourth. This means, from 
your point of view, that the chances are 3 to l that the 
second series will be correct as compared to each ot the 
others. This string will remind you of this. Whe,n I 
present a card, you will have juat 7 seconda 1n which to 
l'lip do.m one ot the switches. '1'hrow it u •oon aa you 
have rnac1e a decision--don't wait! Once a switch is 
thrown, it stops this automatic timer, and you can't 
change your mind on that card even though I keep the 
card up tor the remainder ot the 7 seconds. If at the 
end of 7 seconds you haven't thrown a switch, I'll call 
"time" and ask you to press the "No guess" switch. (Re-
peat.) 
For example, here is the tire t card. If you didn 1 t 
want to guess which of the 4 series is going to emerge, 
you would throw the lert-hand switch labeled "No-guess." 
It on the basis of what you saw you thought the correct 
series was BEPP you would throw the switch directly be-
low it, and so on. Now, throw the switch you want tor 
this lst card. Okay! Now, throw the switch back, please. 
With each card, leave the switch down until I say "okay." 
Try to kee~ your hands on the table between cards, rather 
than ~lse at the sWitches. Now I 111 present the second 
card this example, and you 1 ll have just 7 seconds in 
which to throw one of the switches. Whatever your de-
cision, flip down the appropriate switch as soon as you've 
made your decision. Ready? Here 1 s card #2. (Example 
continued to completion, at which point E points out that 
the more likely alternative was correct.) 
Now let's go through a second example just to make 
sure that everything is clear. This time the images 
will be fruits. Here's what they look like individually--
apple, orange, pear, and lemon. This time there are only 
two possible orders in which they can appear, as you can 
see from this slip on the switchbox; apple, lemon, pear, 
orange; or orange, pear, lemon, apple. As this example 
has been set up, three out of every four people will be 
shown the first series--apple, lemon, pear, orange. In 
other words, without knowing for sure which series you 
will get, the chances are 3 to l in favor of the first, 
although it still might be the second. Okay--all ready 
to start the example? (Example continued to completion, 
at which point E points out that the more likely alterna-
tive was correct.) 
Now we're ready to start the experiment. Each of 
the tasks coming up will be run in this same way, ex-
cept that there will be 14 cards in each task. I'll 
always show you what the possible choices are, and if 
some are more likely to be correct than others, I'll 
let you know. Any questions before we start? 
Dependent variable: As mentioned earlier, the dependent 
variable is time to final decision. In this case, the measure-
ment is quite simple, being merely the card in the series of 
14 on which S makes a final, unchanged decision. Because 
card #l in each series is identical for all four alternatives, 
the effective range for final decision is between cards #2 
and #14, although a very few wild guesses on card #l were 
made. 
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Several anclllary measurements were also taken. The 
card on which a first guess was made, and the card on which 
the first correct guess was made were recorded in each case. 
However, since all findings concerning these were essentially 
the same as they were tor the final decision, no separate 
analysis or report is made herein. Also, the time to respond 
was recorded on each card to the nearest second. This tea-
ture was not seriously planned as a dependent measure. It is 
not a good analogue to ambiguity resolution, being more like 
a measure of confidence and pure reaction time mixed together. 
Therefore, a report of these data are also omitted. 4 
Equipment: Appendix A contains a sketch of the equip-
ment used.5 Briefly, it consisted of the following items: 
1. A switchbox situated in tront of s. There are five 
switches, the first of which is for "no guess" and the 
others tor the alternatives available to S. Above the 
switches is a clear plastic-covered slot into which the 
alternatives are inserted so that each switch is clearly 
labeled through each series. 
2. A panel between E and S, with lights onE's side 
4. In addition any analysis of these data is open to arti-
factual problems because ot the relationship between 
response time per card and decision time per series. 
5. The equipment was used in a previous eXPeriment by 
Arthur M. Cohen. The writer is grateful to Dr. Cohen 
tor his help in this respect. 
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indicating which switch has been thrown by s. This panel 
also served to block from S a view of E's face, so that 
S received no facial cues about his performance. S was 
in view of E through a window reflection. 
3. Two photographer's timers connected to the panel. 
One was set in motion at the beginning of each task 
series, and ran throughout the series to keep E on a 
constant time schedule. The other was started con-
currently with the exposure of each card, and was 
stopped automatically by the throwing of a switch by S, 
giving a measure of response time per card. 
SubJects: Subjects were drawn from the summer session 
at Boston University. About half were volunteers, the other 
half taking part as a course requirement. All were enrolled 
in introductory courses in psychology, sociology, or human 
relations. They were paid two dollars for about one hour's 
time. Mean age was 21.9, with the mode at 20 and a range 
from 16 to 54. There was a two to one proportion of males 
to females. 
Procedures from subjects view-point: The design and ex-
perimental procedures are admittedly difficult to grasp from 
a single reading of the foregoing pages. In order to rectify 
this, let us look at a typical experimental session from the 
viewpoint of one of the subjects. In order to cover every-
thing, we shall choose one of the 64 subjects used in the 
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test of absolute strengths, as well as in the tests of the 
other variables. 
~ the time S had entered the experimental room, he had 
already completed the F scale in class, but he did not know 
that it was connected with his role in the experiment. Up-
on entering the experimental room, he was welcomed by E and 
shown to his seat. The instructions were then read to him, 
and he went through the two practice series. Almost invari-
ably, the routine was clear to him by the time the second 
practice series was completed. Let us take his first condi-
tion to be that in which he had four equally weighted alterna-
tives available to him. A strip of cardboard labels was 
slipped in above the switches on his switchbox, such that the 
first switch was labeled "No Guess" and the other four were 
labeled with the four orders in which the stimulus components 
might fall. S was given one minute to study these, and told 
that each alternative order was as likely to be correct as 
any of the others. 
At the end of a minute, Sheard "Here's card #1" and 
saw the let of the 14 cards. Typically, he either threw the 
"No Guess" switch after a few seconds, or waited without 
throwing a switch. At the end of seven seconds the card 
was laid on its face and S waited 13 seconds, then heard 
"Here 1 s card #2." This process was continued through the 
fourteen cards in the series. 
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At the end of the series, E removed the cards and set up 
the cards for the next series. Taking the two-unequal-alter-
natives condition next in this description, E would remove 
the labels from S's switchbox and insert a similar strip of 
cardboard containing "No Guess," the two alternative orders 
now available for the next stimulus, and two blocked out 
areas, in that order. Again S was given one minute to study 
the labels, and this time was told that, for example, the 
second alternative (third switch) was three times as likely 
to be correct, Just as in the practice series. Again, he 
heard "Here's card #1" and then went through the 14 new cards 
as described above. 
Taking the four-unequal-alternatives condition next, E 
again removed the cards and set up new ones for the third 
series. The appropriate labels were inserted in S's switch-
box and S was given one minute to familiarize himself with 
them. He was told, in the case of the more probable condi-
tion, that a particular one of the alternatives was three 
times as likely to be correct as any of the others individu-
ally. This was rephrased for him as "In other words, out of 
every six people taking part in the experiment, three are 
given this alternative, and one gets this, one this, and one 
this" (as E pointed to the corresponding switches and labels). 
Again S went through the new 14 card series, and the next 
series was set up, in this case for the two-equal-alternatives 
condition. The same procedure was again followed, but since 
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this 3 was used to test the absolute strengths hypothesis, 
he was run through the two-equal-alternatives condition five 
times, in accordance with the pattern outlined on page 33 
above. This test of the absolute strengths hypothesis was 
of course always conducted by an expansion of the two-equal-
alternatives condition, wherever it might fall in the time 
sequence, and the same stimulus series was used in all five 
trials. 
Upon completion of the last series, 3 was informed that 
this was the end of the experiment, and invited to comment 
on any aspect of it. The discussion usually revolved around 
the instruction set dealing with probabilities, and often 
also around the application of the findings to "real life." 
The experiment was explained to S, and his cooperation 
elicited in withholding information until all subjects had 
been run. (It is worthy of note that, upon being questioned, 
each S reported that he was given ~ information by previous 
S's, or was told "You're going to be the first astronaut," 
"It's a parlor game," and similar examples of collegiate 
humor.) 
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CHAPTER III: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
TASK DIFFICULTIES 
An attempt was made in the construction of the four task 
series to equate their difficulty by building up the informa-
tion in each in like manner, based on a set proportion of 
the total information given on the final card in each series; 
(in practice this meant filling in minute areas of each pio-
ture-'Qy (;Onstant steps, the decision on which areas were to 
be filled in being determined by a technique analogous to 
stratified random sampling,) 1 It was the purpose of this, 
of course, to eliminate, as much as possible, uncontrolled 
variance due to unequal task difficulty. The success of 
this attempt can be Judged by reference to Table I. 
Series #2 is clearly out of line with the others, as can 
be seen by the final entry in each column and by the fact 
that in five out of six conditions the final decision comes 
earlier. The fact that each subject falls into four of the 
six conditions makes an overall analysis of variance impossi-
ble, but six separate analyses--one for each condition--is 
acceptable, since noane-;;ccurs twice in the same row. The F's 
in the right hand column are based on these 1 x 4 analyses 
of variance. 
1. See Appendix A for steps in the construction of the 
stimulus materials. 
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Table I: Final Decision on Four Task series, by 
.,, Condition 
(entry = average card of tinal decision) 
series 
Condition #1-.Animals #2-Qeometric #3-Numbers #4-Heter- F o~eneous 
2 Equal 7.64 6.07 7.00 6.71 0.85 Alternatives 
2 Unequal Alt. 
"more probable" 6.63 5.50 6.17 7.83 1.20 
2, 1JnequaJ. Alt. 7.00 7.83 7.00 5.75 0.82 
"less probable" 
4 Equal • 9.00 7.07 9.71 9.57 3.45 Alternatives 
·''\!l<j 
·. ':fii 
4 Unequal Alt. • 
"more probable" 8.25 5.50 8.75 9.67 4.06 
4 Unequal Al t . 
"less probable" 9.17 7.38 10.23 11.63 3.41 • 
OVerall 8.02 6.55 8.20 8.43 
* p (.05 
'IG 
In the two-alternative conditions, the difference between 
tasks can be attributed to chance. However, this is not true 
when the number of alternatives is increased to four. This 
fact in itself is of some interest, indicating that there may 
be an interaction between task difficulty and the number of 
competing response tendencies aroused by the stimulus. 
Another factor discernible from Table I is that it is 
unlikely that any technique can be found to transform the 
data from each series to a common scale, thus reducing ex-
traneous variance attributable to unequal task difficulties, 
The ranks of difficulty in each condition jump around con-
siderably, and any overall transformation would do unequal 
violence to these relationships. Consequently, the results 
reported below are based on raw, untransformed data, even 
though some extraneous variance is involved. 
ANALYSIS 
With this preamble, we can now go to the tests of the 
hypotheses. Due to the unusual design, as illustrated earlier, 
no single analysis can be performed across conditions of equal-
ity, so the data are reported separately below for each of the 
three conditions. 
Hypothesis #1, dealjng with the number of competing re-
sponse tendencies, leads to the data prediction that subjects 
will show greater time to final decision when they have four 
,alternatives from which to choose than when they have only 
· two alternatives. Table II swnmar1zes these data. 
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Equal (N=28 per cell) 
Unequal 
"more probable" (14 unmatched 
S's per cell) 
(14 matched 
S's per cell) 
Unequal 
"less probable" (14 unmatched 
S's per cell) 
(14 matched 
s' s per cell ) 
Table II: Comparisons of Mean card of Final 
Decision with 2 and 4 Alternatives 
Two 
Alternatives 
6.86 
7.43 
5.43 
7.14 
6.93 
Four 
Alternatives 
8.79 
7.86 
8.36 
9.86 
8.93 
.. 
one-tailed tests 
t d.f. 
4.02 54 
.48 26 
4.72 13 
2.67 26 
2.00 13 
.. 
p 
(.Ol 
(.35 
(.Ol 
(.Ol 
(.05 
Comb~ed 
p 
(.05 
(.Ol 
t~ 
·'-'·"!·:-
~ 
The data indicate clearly that the first hypothesis may 
be accepted; a larger number of competing response tendencies 
leads to later decision making. The combined probabilities 
indicated in the last column for the unequal probability 
conditions were necessitated by the fact that only half of 
the subjects in each of the "more" and "less probable" con-
ditions with two alternatives appear also in the same condi-
tion with four alternatives, as explained earlier. 
Hypothesis #2, dealing with the absolute strengths or 
competing response tendencies, leads to the data prediction 
that subjects in the "stronger" (reinforced) condition will 
show greater time to decision than those 1n the "weaker" 
(non-reinforced) condition. Table III summarizes these data. 
Table III: Comparisons of Mean Card of Final 
Decision in "Stronger" and "Weaker" 
Conditions 
Mean t p 
Stronger 4.81 
.68 n. s. 
Weaker 4.50 
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Figure V: Mean Card of Pinal Decision for 
"Stronger" and "Weaker" Conditions 
"Stronger" 
)., ] J-1 .) 
Trial 
Trial#l: 
2: 
3: 
4: 
5: 
Stronger Weaker 
7.03 
6.34 
5.63 
5.06 
4.81 
6.53 
6.28 
5.28 
4.84 
4.50 
~ 
-:r~ .,.;~ 
-~!.·. 
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It is clear that as stated, the second hypothesis is not 
tenable. Absolute strengths do not affect decision time. We 
stress here the phrase "as stated" because it will be shown 
later that in fact the hypothesis is acceptable for high 
authoritarians. 
Figure V shows graphically how the two groups performed 
over the five trials, the fifth being the critical trial as 
reported in Table III. 
It can be seen that the performance of the two groups is 
remarkably parallel, and that the difference between them on 
the critical trial represents no departure from the differ-
ences in trials 1 to 4. This is noted here in order to pro-
vide a baseline against which to compare the results when 
broken into high and low authoritarians, as reported later. 
aypothesis #3, having to do with the equality of strength 
of competing response tendencies, leads to the data predic-
tions that the mean card of decision time would be lowest in 
the "more probable" conditions, next lowest in the equal con-
ditions, and highest in the "less probable" conditions (for 
both 2 and 4 alternatives). The overall data can be seen in 
Table II, already reported. Reference to that table (p. 54) 
will show that the hypothesis may be tenable. The only cell 
which is out of line is the second cell in the two-alternative 
column, where the figure is much too high. Some of the differ-
ences are very small, however, and further analysis is re-
quired. Since, as before, no single overall test can be 
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Table IV: Comparisons Pertinent to a Test of 
Eguality of Strengths gypothesis 
Conditions Means t d. f. 
2 Ec,Jual vs • 2 Une~ual 
more probable 6.86 vs. 6.62 0.37 • 27 
2 ~1 vs. 2 Une~ual 
'less probable' 6.86 vs. 7.04 0.37 • 27 
4 E~ual vs. 4 Uhe~ual 
'more probable' 7-75 vs. 8.11 0.53 • 27 
4 E~ual vs. 4 UneFl • 27 9.83 vs. 9.40 0.61 
'less probable 
2 Unequal "less" vs. 
"more probable" 7.04 vs. 6.62 0.60 54 
4 Unequal "less" vs. 
"more probable" 9.40 vs. 8.11 1.77 54 
• performed on matched s•s 
tdirection correctly predicted, one-tailed tests employed 
p 
n.s. t 
n.s;t 
n.s. 
n.s. 
<.30-r 
<..o5t 
Combined 
p 
.oat 
~ 
_ ... >~~~ 
.:. (,!'f~-~'~ 
.~--<~ 
performed on these data, the pertinent comparisons are pre-
sented in Table IV. 
Judging from Table IV, the picture has changed a little. 
It is clear from the first four rows that the difference be-
tween the equal and the various unequal conditions is not a 
meaningful one. The 5th and 6th rows present a finding which 
does approach significance, however, especially when four 
alternatives are presented. The general hYpothesis then re-
ceives only partial support, and that only in the four-alter-
native condition. The implications of this will be explored 
in the discussion section, but one point should be suggested 
here. Since the effects of "set" are rather well established, 
the equivocal findings reported in Table IV are probably 
better explained by faults in the experimental devices of 
this study. More specifically, there is a strong possibility 
that the induction of the equality of strengths variable was 
not entirely successful. 
Several indications of unsuccessful induction •~ill be re-
ported in the Discussion section, but one very strong indica-
tion will be reported here, since it has empirical backing. 
It will be remembered that each subject was .i.n two of the 
unequal-probability conditions. Separate analyses of each 
{first and second, regardless of task, order of conditions, 
etc.) again reveals no differences in decision time attribut-
able to differences in the probabilities ass1o1ed to the 
correct alternative. Assuming for the moment that this is 
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due to the subjects' £ailing to accept the verbal set, there 
is a chance that the instructions rein£orced by experience 
would produce the hypothesized effects. 
This can be tested by comparing two groups of subjects. 
The £irst group consists o£ those individuals who were in 
the "more probable" condition both times, and the second 
consists o£ those who were in the "more probable" condition 
the first time but the "less probable" condition the second 
time. In other words, the first time both groups had the 
instruction set rein£orced by experience--the more likely 
alternative did turn out to be the correct one. This should 
set both groups up for the test in their second unequal-
probabilities condition, in which (if the rein£orcement is 
successful) those in the "more probable" condition would be 
expected to reach a decision earlier than those in the "less 
probable" condition. 
The respective means are 7.09 and 8.72, with the dif£er-
ence in the expected direction yielding a t of 8.32, signifi-
cant beyond the .01 level. This difference holds up regard-
less of whether the S's were in the 2 or 4-alternative con-
ditions. What this amounts to, then, is a confirmation of 
hypothesis #3 when the equality-inequality of strengths vari-
able is induced through verbal instruction and the individual's 
own experience, but not when the attempted induction is through 
verbal instruction alone. 
6o 
-:~~~;~: 
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HYpotheses #4a,b,c, and d all have to do with authoritar~ 
ianism. Although they are auxiliary to the main purposes of 
the study, they may shed some light on the previously re-
ported findings. Number 4a leads to the prediction that 
high F subjects will show greater time to decision than low 
F subjects. Numbers 4b, c, and dare all corollaries to this, 
predicting an accentuation of the earlier predicted differ-
ences among high F as opposed to low F subjects. 
Table V reports on the differences between high and low 
authoritarians for each condition of equality and number of 
alternatives. T tests and p values are not reported, since 
in no case do they approach statistical significance. 
Table V: Mean Card of Decision for High and Low 
Authoritarian in 2- and 4-Alternative Conditions 
Two-Alternatives Four-Alternative~ 
High F LowF dirt. High F LowF dirt. 
Equal 6.96 6.75 + .21 8.79 8.79 0 
Unequal 
"more 
probable" 5.93 6.93 -1.00 8.64 7.57 +1.07 
Unequal 
"less 
probable" 7.50 6.57 + .93 9.36 9.43 - .07 
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Not only are the differences between high and low F subjects 
at a chance level, but also they show no consistent trend. 
The hypothesis is not supported, and one must conclude that, 
overall, high authoritarians are no more likely than are low 
authoritarians to delay resolution of ambiguous figures. 
This makes it unlikely that the corollary hypotheses can be 
accepted--that high authoritarians will show an accentuated 
difference between high and low conflict conditions. Table 
VI summarizes the pertinent data for investigating accentua-
tion between the two and four-alternative conditions. 
Condition 
Equal 
Unequal 
"more 
probable" 
Unequal 
"less 
probable" 
Table VI: Accentuation by F Scores of 
Differences between 2- and 
4-Alternative Conditions 
High F--Mean Low F--Mean 
Difference, Difference, Accentuation--
4-Alt.-2-Alt, 4-Alt.-2-Alt. High F-Low F 
1.96 (N=28) 2,04 (N=28) - .oa * 
3.71 (Na7} 2.57 (N•7) +1.14 • 
1.86 (N=7) 2,14 (Ncq} - .28 * 
*t tests yield p values of no statistical 
significance. 
·~~~:;_-,: 
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As expected from the previous discussion, but contrary 
to the hypothesis, high authoritarians do not differ from 
low authoritarians in their greater time to decision under 
a four-alternative than a two-alternative condition (hypoth-
esis 4b), 
However, the situation is quite different with respect 
to accentuation due to F of the absolute strengths predic-
tions (hypothesis 4c). It will be remembered (see Table III 
and Figure V) that different absolute strengths exhibited no 
effect on time to final decision. But when the data are 
separated into the high and low F groups, a different_ picture 
emerges, 
Table VII: Mean Card of Final Decision; 
Absolute Strengths and Authoritarianism 
High F LowF 
"Stronger" 5.44 4.19 (N .. l6) (N=l6 
"Weaker" 4.00 5.00 
(N=l6) (N•l6 
The reverse directions in the two columns of Table VII 
certainly suggests an interaction effect, such that accentua-
tion due to authoritarianism may have occurred. This can be 
tested by a t-test of the difference between differences in 
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the high F and low F conditions. It will be remembered that 
each subject in the "stronger" condition is matched in the 
"weaker" condition by a subject with a similar F score. 
Thus there are 16 matched high F pairs and 16 matched low F 
pairs or subjects. Contrasting the responses or the two 
members or each pair in the "stronger" and "weaker" condi-
tiona yields a mean difference between conditions ot absolute 
strengths tor high F subjects, and a similar mean difference 
for low F subjects. Subtacting the response score or the mem-
ber in the "weaker" condition from that ot his counterpart in 
the "stronger" condition, and testing the difference between 
the two means or these summated subtractions yield the data 
in Table VIII. 
Table VIII1 Interaction ot Absolute Strengths 
and Authoritarianism; Mean Differences 
between Matched Pairs in "Stronger" 
and "Weaker" Conditions 
Mean t p 
High F +1.44 
4.79 <·Ol 
LowF - .81 
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It is clear, then, that the effect ot absolute strengths 
ot competing response tendencies may be more pronounced among 
high authoritarians than among low author! tarians. 'l'his also 
means that the conclusion drawn earlier about hypothesis #2 
must be revised, for it appears that is has been partially 
confirmed. That is, increasing the absolute strengths ot 
competing response tendencies does lead to greater time to 
decision among higher authoritarian individuals. That these 
findings are a tunction ot reinforcement or non-reinforce-
ment over the f1rat tour trials ot the test period, and not a 
a matter ot initial differences between the tour groups, can 
be seen by reference to Figure VI, which reports the overall 
7 • 0 Figure VI : Total Variances, Trials 1 to 5 
6.0 
5.0 
4.0 
(d.f. .. 3) 
3.0 
2.0 
1.0 
( .40) 
0 1 
(.58) ( .16) 
2 3 
XX Between Groups 
• = Within Groups 
p (d.t.-3) 
(.32) (2.53) 
4 5 
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variances for each trial. As should be expected, total vari-
ance goes down over time, but the things to note here are the 
F tests tor the between groups variances, as indicated in the 
parentheses tor each trial. These F's are very small except 
tor trial 5--the critical trial--at which point the groups 
separate dramatically, with an overall F tor variance be-
tween groups/within groups or 2.53 (pc.o6). In other words, 
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while overall variance decreases over trials, the amount or 
variance attributed to the differences between groups remains 
stable until trial 5. On this last critical trial the four ex-
perimental groups separate due to differential experimental 
treatments. 
The remaining corollary hypothesis (4d) has to do with 
accentuation by authoritarianism o:f dit'ferences between the 
conditions ot equality-inequality of competing response tend-
encies. The pertinent data can best be summarized by exapnd-
ing Table IV on page 59 to separate the high F :from low F 
subjects, as in Table IX below. 
Again, the hypothesis is untenable, although the directions 
are right in the 2-alternative conditions. High authoritarians 
are no more affected than low authoritarianB by varying con-
ditions of equality ot strengths; i.e., the accentuation 
hypothesis must be rejected here, as it was with respect to 
the variable of number of competing response tendencies. 
Table IX: Accentuation by Authoritarianism of Differences 
between Conditions of Equality of Strengths 
2 dift.* • Conditions F Scores Means t 
>· 2 Equal VB. 2 Un- High 7.04 vs. 5.93 +1.14 +1.13 
equal "more probable" Low 6.6 vs. 6.93 - .29 
2 Equal VB • 2 Un- High 6.86 VB. 7.50 + .64 + .95 
equal "less probable" Low 6.86 vs. 6.57 - .29 
4 Equal VB • 4 Un- High 7.71 VB. 8.64 
- .93 - .84 
equal "more probable" Low 7.79 vs. 7.57 + .22 
4 Equal vs. 4 Un- High 9.86 vs. 9.36 
- .50 - .10 
equal "less probable" Low 9.79 vs. 9.43 - .36 
Inter-
action 
-F 
2 Unequal "less" vs. High 7.50 vs. 5.93 +1.5~ +1.88 
"more probable" Low 6.57 VB. 6.93 
- .3 
4 Unequal "less" vs. High 9.~6 VB. 8.64 + ·~ - .59 
"more probable" Low g. 3 vs. 7.57 +1. 6 
* A plus sign (+) indicates direction as predicted 
-
Because these groups are all composed of different S's the F test 
tor interaction is most appropriate here 
t Degrees of freedom are halved, due to significantly different 
variances as tested by F 
d.f. 
13T 
26 
13t 
26 
d.f. 
1 & 52 
1 & 52 
p 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
n.s. 
p 
n.s. 
n.s. 
C1l 
""! 
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DISCUSSION 
Since the data are a bit complex, and several differ-
ent types or analyses were necessitated, a brief summary or 
the findings would seem in order at this point. As to the 
major focus ot the study--understanding the perception or 
ambiguity through propositions _derived from studies or con-
flict--considerable but not complete verification has been 
achieved. The greater the number or competing response 
tendencies aroused, the greater is the time taken to reach 
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a final decision as to the identification ot a visual stimu-
lus. Also, greater absolute strength of competing response 
tendencies leads to greater decision time among higher 
authoritarians, but not among lower authoritarians. 
It was not possible, in a task which allows S to check 
the correctness ot his response prior to a subsequent re-
sponse, to test Berlyne's proposition concerning the equality 
or competing response tendencies. This tact in and or it-
self, however, suggests a qualification to that proposition, 
to the ettect that the opportunity for obtaining response 
feedback must be taken into account. Several conditions of 
equality-inequality were incorporated into the study design 
in hopes ot demonstrating the directions such a qualification 
must take, but the demonstration was only partially success-
ful. The equality-inequality differences did not have any 
demonstrable effect on time to decision. However, the 
differences between the condition in which the correct stim-
ulus was unlikely and that in which it was highly likely to 
occur did lead to decision time differences or statistical 
significance, depending upon the means by which the variable 
was induced. 'l'he verbal set had to be reinforced by a suc-
cessful instance. 
With respect to authoritarianism, the findings were 
somewhat equivocal. Authoritarianism did not effect time to 
final decision, overall, but it did interact with the vari-
able of absolute strengths. In addition, the accentuation 
hypotheses were not generally supported. 
It is in the nature of scientific investigations that 
positive findings seldom require extended explanation, while 
equivocal or negative findings do beg tor clarification. 
Accordingly, before moving on to some ot the positive impli-
cations or these finding~ we shall suggest some possible 
reasons tor the lack or complete hypothesis verification. 
For instance, why didn't the hypothesis concerning equal 
versus unequal probabilities receive complete support? 
Surely it does not mean that "set," or attention is not an 
effective variable--the findings over many years mitigate 
against such a conclusion. The explanation, then, must re-
side somewhere in the experimental procedures themselves. 
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The moat likely fault lies in the induction of the variable, 
as was indicated by the fact that the induction was at least 
successful for the differences between the less probable and 
more probable conditions when the instruction set was re-
inforced by experience. 
There are two major facets to the induction problem 
here, the ratio of the probabilities induced and the subjects' 
belief in what theywere told. As to the first, a review of 
the induced probability ratios suggests that this may indeed 
have been one source of trouble. In the two unequal alter-
native conditions, the ratios were 3 to 1; i.e., the correct 
alternative was either three times as likely, or one third 
as likely to occur. It will be remembered that thL hypoth-
esis received no support in the two-alternative condition. 
When there were tour alternatives, the weights assigned were 
3-1-1-1 and 1-3-3-3, the three alike weights being assigned 
to the incorrect alternatives. Compressing these yields 
ratios of correct to incorrect of l out of 2 and 1 out of 
10. Here the hypothesis received more support, and in this 
fact resides the implication that greater ratios might have 
produced happier results. A number of subjects reported the 
obvious effect that the probabilities led them to focus their 
attention on the more likely alternatives, and increasing 
the ratios would presumably have led to more of this focusing. 
Closely related to the above is the question of the 
credibility or the induction. Some or the subjects reported 
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spontaneously that they did not really believe the experi-
menter, while others reported that "experience" had taught 
them not to go by odds--"every case is different" and "it's 
like not using stereotypes" are two statements that come to 
mind, Deutsch (21) has shown that high authoritarians are 
more likely to be auspicious and untrusting than low authori-
tarians. In tact, he states this to be the case ", •• in 
an ambiguous situation involving the choices of' trusting or 
not. , • II While we have no obJective data to suggest Just 
how much distrust there was in this study, it has been shown 
that Deutsch 1 s findings are applicable to some degree. All 
of' this suggests strongly that in future experiments designed 
to test the equality of' strength hypothesis the induction 
should be accomplished through practice, rather than through 
mere verbal instructions. That is, probabilities learned 
through experience may well have more effect on action than 
those merely assigned by an outside person. 
As for the failure of' authoritarianism to yield stable 
and consistent findings, several possible explanations may 
be offered, any or all of' which may be pertinent. First and 
foremost is ot course the possibility that the F scale, 
though a reliable instrument, is not valid as an indicator 
ot reactions to conflict, especially in the perceptual 
medium. Both Titus and Hollander (63) and Christie and 
Cook (18) have pointed out in their extensive reviews ot the 
literature on authoritarianism that the F scale has 
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generally been found to relate more directly to other paper-
and-pencil measures and attitudinal responses than to per-
ceptual and action variables. Intolerance of ambiguity has 
been seriously questioned as a stable component or authori-
tarianism by Christie and Cook and by Loomis and Moskowitz 
(38), among others. It may be, for instance, that the F 
scale is insensitive to conflict resolution because there 
are so many ways of reacting to conflict, some of them intra-
psychic and thus not easily quantifiable. 
Another avenue of explanation lies in the nature of F 
score distributions. Frenkel-Brunsw1k's formulations in 
relation to rigidity and intolerance of ambiguity were de-
rived trom experiments using the upper and lower extremes of 
the distribution. It, as seems to be the case, replications 
ot her general findings are not commonly found when the dis-
tribution is cut at the median, one must question the "power" 
of authoritarianism as a variable. It should be noted in 
this connection that the subjects in the present experiment 
were generally situated toward the non-authoritarian end of 
the dimension, thus perhaps decreasing the "power" of the 
variable. Also, the subjects were college undergraduates, a 
group undergoing attitudinal and value change. Christie 
and Cook, noting the value inconsistencies in this popula-
tion, question the wisdom of using undergraduates in F scale 
studies. This is another way of questioning the power of 
this variable. 
Yet all this requires a note ot caution, tor authori-
tarianism ~ interact in this study with absolute strengths 
ot competing response tendencies in a way that cannot reason-
ably be attributed to chance. It may be, then, that authori-
tarianism is somewhat specific in its effects. Judging from 
the interaction just mentioned, one might hypothesize that 
authoritarianism is most likely to interact with sources of 
conflict built up through personal experience, i.e., where 
perceptible reinforcement over time has taken place. Cer-
tainly some such limiting statement is more in line with 
the decline in modern psychology of the status of general 
traits which it was onced hoped might permeate in their 
effects all situations and contexts. Kenny and Ginsberg 
(34) among others have indicated that intolerance ot ambigu-
ity cannot be considered a general trait, and Brown's (12) 
study has indicated at least one major contextual variable 
that can in tact reverse the findings from studies of author-
itarianism. 
Summarizing these considerations briefly, one can say 
on the basis of the present data and a general summary of 
past studies (l) that the relationship of authoritarianism 
to conflict resolution (or ambiguity resolution) is somewhat 
tenuous generally, (2) and that more attention should be 
paid to outlining the differential effects of authoritarian-
ism on various sources of conflict and modes of handling 
conflict. 
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With these matters laid aside, there is left still a 
discussion of the findings concerning the major focus of 
this study. It has been demonstrated, albeit not completely, 
that the time taken to reach a final decision concerning the 
identification of an ambiguous visual stimulus is directly 
related to the degree of conflict between competing response 
tendencies brought to bear on the decision. That these find-
ings tend to corroborate those of Berlyne, Brown and Farber, 
Barker, and others cited earlier is of secondary import, 
since these writers have already established the validity of 
the principles involved, More important here is the question 
of where these findings take us theoretically. 
If the reader will permit a modicum of extrapolation 
from the present data, and grant the assumption that further 
empirical work will substantiate the general tenor of the 
conclusions drawn above, then several directions can be noted. 
First, the possibility that the perception of ambiguity can 
be subsumed under conflict theory must be taken seriously. 
The propositions with which this study have dealt have been 
drawn from behavior theory, and it is thus only .natural to 
suggest that a behavioristic model is the most appropriate. 
However, whether this indeed ~ be so is not clear--other 
conflict models (e.g., psychodynamic) may also apply. The 
point here, however, is that there seems to be little about 
ambiguity--as a concept--that demands any separation from 
empirically established models or theories already extant 
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in psychology. If predictions from an existing model are 
confirmed, then it is parsimonious to employ that model 
throughout unless and until it fails to live up to its 
promise. All this leads to a clear formulation of the status 
of ambiguity in a behavior model as merely any stimulus which 
activates competing response tendencies. Degree of ambiguity, 
then, corresponds to intensity of conflict, as suggested by 
Berlyne, and can be a response-defined concept. This con-
clusion is similar to that reached by Berlyne with respect 
both to "novelty" and "uncertainty" (5). 
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There is a corollary to this, to the effect that ambigu- ~> 
ity should be conceived as an individual affair. If six 
individuals looking at the same object respond immediately 
and certainly with six different percepts, the object cannot 
be said to be ambiguous, tor it has not activated competing 
response tendencies. Thus, past investigators (e.g., Wiggins, 
Davids) who have used stimuli defined as ambiguous because 
they have been differently described by a number of individ-
uals have, in so doing, used a very gross measure of ambigu-
ity--a measure which corresponds to the above conception 
only if the variance in percepts over individuals mirrors a 
corresponding intra-individual contusion. If such a mirror-
ing does not exist, predictions to variables such as de-
cision time may well E£! be confirmed. 
Another direction pointed to by the present conclusions 
has to do with Bruner's general model or perception. As 
pointed out in Chapter II (pp. 21, 22), the conflict propo-
sitions outlined by Berlyne are easily translatable into 
Bruner's terminology. It would seem to rollow, then, that 
this general model is surficient to cover the case of per-
ceiving ambiguous visual stimuli. Bruner speaks convincingly 
(13, p. 127) 1n favor of an overall perceptual theory in 
which the individual processes of achieving veridicality 
are essentially the same 1n ~. differing only in degree, 
whether the conditions are substandard (as in ambiguity) or 
more than adequate. There is no reason to question the 
generality of this model on the basis of the data presented 
herein. Certainly the model covers nicely the processes 
and findings of the present study, especially with respect 
to "category accessibility," the analogue to competing re-
sponse tendencies. 
How, then, does one choose between the conflict theory 
and perceptual models? At this point the question may be un-
answerable. Both models would lead to the same general pre-
dictions; both are capable of generating new hypotheses; 
both involve inferences concerning the mediating processes 
of perception; both indicate that the perception of ambiguity 
lies toward the extreme of a dimension running through the 
decision process itself, and is not qualitatively different 
from any other decision process. It would in fact, seem 
that the two apporaches converge remarkably well at the point 
of prediction. The conflict model is perhaps more analytic 
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and the perceptual model is more descriptive and in the nature 
of an analogue, but this may merely be a fUnction of longevity. 
The writer would tentatively suggest at this point that 
the two approaches converge at a general point which can be 
termed decision or action theory, specifying the stimulus and 
intrapsychic conditions of which both cognitive choice and 
behavioral action are a fUnction. Some support for this out 
of the present data comes from the fact, alluded to earlier, 
that time to final decision, time to first guess, and time to 
first correct guess were all related in the same way to the 
independent variables. 
At this point Bruner's system tends more to highlight 
the transactional relationship between stimulus and response, 
being less specific about the nature of the intervening 
processes that lead to what he terms the "match-mismatch" 
process. Berlyne's emphasis is more on specifying the nature 
of the intervening processes, less on the nature of the acti-
vating stimulus--intensity of conflict is for Berlyne essen-
tially a response variable. If there is a major distinction 
to be drawn concerning the problem of ambiguity, it would be 
that Bruner's approach leads more readily to a specification 
of the stimulus properties which produce ambiguity, while 
Berlyne's deals more with the way in which these properties 
are tied to response variables. At this point, however, we 
may be splitting conceptual hairs, for both approaches 
serve the fUnction of taking the magic out of the "black 
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box" mediating between stimulus and response. 
In any case, it is strongly suggested that ambiguous 
stimuli and ambiguous situations are analogous to conflict 
producing factors. In looking over all of the stimuli men-
tioned in Chapter I, one sees that all of them can be de-
scribed in terms of the way in which they can be expected 
to produce antagonistic response tendencies. In many cases, 
the stimuli are ambiguous by virtue of the fact that they 
are not clearly evocative of easily specifiable alternatives 
or response tendencies. Putting it another way, their in-
formation value is similar for many categories, the strengths 
of which are determined by intra-individual factors. As 
examples, one can cite the various projective devices, 
Smith's silent group member (60), and Brim's questionnaire 
(9, 10) in which subjects must estimate various statistics 
on which they have no objective information. 
In other cases the ambiguity arises from the incom-
parability of alternatives, as in reversible figures and 
Adams' (l) and Zaleznik's (68) use of "status incongruency." 
Most of the studies cited unwittingly built in equality of 
strengths as well. Nor do these instances or the foci of 
the present study limit the means by which ambiguity can be 
induced, for intensity of conflict can be a function or other 
factors. For instance, increasing the severity of perceived 
consequences of alternatives and varying the probabilities 
of these consequences will change the degree of conflict 
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involved. The approach-approach and avoidance-avoidance 
types of conflicts have also been shown to have different 
effects upon reactions. Berlyne (7) lists these as well 
as stimulus complexity, drive, and reward as further cor-
relates of degree of conflict. 
FU'l'URE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Almost any empirical investigation serves not only to 
test present bypotheses, but also to suggest further steps 
in research. Aside from the ever-present hope for repli-
cation of the present study, we can point to five specific 
recommendations for future research suggested by the findings 
reported herein. 
1. It was noted in Table I, p. 52, that a possible 
interaction existed between the task difficulty and number 
of response alternatives (or competing response tendencies) 
in their effects on decision time. Increasing the number of 
alternatives seemed to have the effect of accentuating the 
differences in mean times to decision between the four stimu-
lus tasks. Primarily, this took the form of increasing the 
distance between the means of the one distinctively easier 
task series and the other three task series. Taking these 
latter three series to be the more ambiguous (by the defini-
tion, p. 75), we can say that the ambiguity can in this case 
be attributed to the cue value of the stimulus, since other 
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sources of ambiguity (e.g., number of alternatives, equality 
of alternatives) are constant over the four series. The 
hypothesis which results is that increasing the number of 
competing response tendencies leads to greater delay in 
recognition of stimuli with leas cue value than in recog-
nition of stimuli with more cue value. Here, then, is a 
proposition that relates two sources of ambiguity in a way 
which leads to differential predictions to a pertinent re-
sponse variable. An experiment to test this would not be 
difficult to design, and could in fact employ the materials 
used in this study. Should the hypothesis be confirmed, it 
would go a long way toward demonstrating the importance of 
specifying the source of ambiguity being considered. In 
Bruner's model, this amounts to saying that the match-
mismatch process is a function of both stimulus input and 
category accessibility, and furthermore, that this process 
is more than merely additive in nature. 
2. The present study could not test Berlyne's propo-
sition concerning the equality of strength of competing re-
sponse tendencies because the stimulus allowed S to check 
his own responses as it became less ambiguous. However, such 
a test could, and should, be set up in a situation in which 
such feedback is not possible. This can be done by using 
stimulus materials that increase in mass but not in form; 
e.g., a figure that is a sketchy "blob" to begin with, and 
a filled in "blob" at the end of the series. The subject 
so 
would be forced to make a definite choice on each trial--
the "no guess" option of the present experiment would be 
eliminated, Several conditions of equality-inequality 
would be set up. with the only·other stricture being that 
a rather sensitive measure of response delay might be called 
for--a time measure rather than a trial measure. perhaps 
along with a measure of subjective certainty. 
3, With respect to the F scale. one specific research 
recommendation emerges, It was noted that authoritarianism 
had little effect on decision time except in interaction 
with induced variations of the absolute strengths of com-
peting response tendencies, Aside from stating the need for 
replicating this part of the study. there emerges the ques-
tion of the specificity of effects attributable to authori-
tarianism according to the source or means of inducing am-
biguity, It was suggested earlier that authoritarianism is 
most relevant when ambiguity results from reinforcement of 
response tendencies. presumably because the conflict thus 
induced "takes" better. or is more intense. or more be-
lievable or obvious to the individual. A whole series of 
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experiments would be advisable here to see if the important 
variable interacting with authoritarianism is merely intensity 
of conflict or if it has to do with the source of the con-
flict. It may be. for instance. that High F subjects are 
more sensitive to conflict induced on the response end of 
things than on the stimulus-cue end (or perhaps to the 
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"encoding" process of fitting cue to category). If some such 
specificity could be demonstrated, the nature of authoritari-
anism itself would become more clear, as would appropriate 
measures or it. 
4. Each or the stimulus cards used in this experiment 
consisted of four components, with the subJect's task being 
to recognize the correct ordering of these components. It 
was implicitly assumed that the task or perceiving an order 
is conceptually the same as that or perceiving a single ele-
2 
ment, but perhaps the assumption needs verification. Each 
of the components could be used separately as stimuli in 
order to perform the test, with prior testing to assure equal 
difficulty of recognition. It is possible that a comparison 
of these simpler images to more complex ones would throw 
light on another aspect of the cue-category relationship, 
such that differential statements concerning conflict arousal 
and time to decision could be tied to stimuli of greater and 
lesser complexity. 
5. Finally, there is as always the question of one's 
research population. It has been generally assumed--and 
this experiment is nq exception--that the perceptual processes 
are sufficiently general across individuals that findings 
established on one group will apply to most others (with some 
2. Gibson (26) has pointed to this problem as one of the 
central theoretical issues in the conceptual area of 
stimulus definition. 
exceptions among the mentally disturbed and damaged). How-
ever, as noted earlier Christie and Cook have found reason 
to question the advisability of using undergraduates in 
studies of authoritarianism. This in itself constitutes 
sufficient reason to try out fUture experiments of this 
nature on child and adult populations. This would be 
especially true when the experimenter wishes to investigate 
more thoroughly the relationships which may hold between 
perception and authoritarianism. 
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APPENDIXES 
Appendix A: Construction of Stimulus 
Figures and Equipment 
Stimulus Figures 
Each aeries of 14 stimulus cards was constructed in 
approximately the same fashion, according to the following 
steps: 
1. The four components of each image were chosen on 
the basis of similar form, and similar mass when all four 
were drawn to the same scale. 
2. Artist's sketches of the four components were 
drawn in such a way that any components, when superimposed 
upon one another, would coincide in outline as much as pos-
sible without distortion of the components. On the average, 
each component fell within an area of four square inches. 
3. Each sketch was then transferred to graph paper, 
(20 lines to an inch), and each one superimposed upon the 
others. This permitted the determination of which boxes 
on the graph paper were unique to one component, which were 
a part of any two components, which were a part of any three 
components, and which were common to all four. 
4. Each component was then built up through the four-
teen cards in each series by a stratified random filling in 
of each box on the graph paper according to the following 
system. 
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a. card 1: to each component (starting with an 
empty sheet) was added 1/14 of the boxes common to 
all four components; 
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b. cards 2 through 13: to each component was added 
1/14 of the common boxes plus 1/13 of the boxes com-
mon to the component being built and to any other 
components; 
c. card 14: the remaining boxes were added--i.e., 
1/14 of the common boxes, 1/13 of those common to 
more than one component, and all of the boxes 
unique to the component being built. 
5. The four components for each card were then trans-
ferred to unlined paper in the order dictated by the design, 
covered with a clear plastic sheet, stapled to a cardboard 
backing and framed by strips of cardboard. With 14 cards 
per series, four order variations per series, and four dif-
ferent series, there were 224 cards in all, L~ addition to 
those used in the practice trials. 
On the next page are hand-drawn sketches of cards #1 
and #14 of the heterogeneous-task series (the other three 
alternatives merely involve a reshuffling of the order in 
which the four components appear). 
Experimental Equipment 
The equipment described below was borrowed from 
another experimenter and modified for the present study. 
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• 
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The room itself contained, in addition to the materials be-
low, two small desks, and was lit by an overhead fluorescent 
light. Extraneous noises were almost non-existent. 
Experimental Equipment 
4. s.[J 
Table, 36" x 72", and straight-back 
chairs for E and S. 
s] 
1. Stimulus cards. dis played manually ( 9 x 12 ) ; 
2. Photographer's timer used to keep E on schedule 
(8 l/2 X 9); 
3. Photographer's timer used to record response time 
per card to the nearest second (8 l/2 x 9); 
4. Master panel blocking view or E's race and 
registering a light corresponding to the switch 
thrown by S (13 X 18 X 3); 
5. Response box containing five response switches 
above which were inserted the response alternatives 
available to s (6 x 8 x 3); 
6. Data sheet ror E to fill in. 
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Appendix B: Raw Data by Subject and Condition 
(Each entry is the card number on which S made a final. decision. ) 
Number and Probabilltz of Alternatives Absolute Strengths 
Subject F 2 Equal 4 Equal 2 Unequal 2 Unequal 4 UDequal 4 Unequal Stronger Weaker 
Alterna- Alterna- Alterna- Alterna- Alterna- Alterna-
tives tives tives tives tives tives 
"More "Less "More "Less 
Probable" Probable" Probable" Probable" 
l 4.28 4 10 5 - - 8 5 
2 4.90 6 9 7 - 13 - 4 
3 4.38 7 9 - 5 10 - 10 
4 4.03 6 4 6 
-
9 - 3 
5 3.86 6 10 - 7 - 8 5 
6 3·93 8 9 8 - - 6 6 
7 4.10 8 l2 7 - - 9 4 -
•.':jj 8 4.52 13 10 8 - l2 - 4 -
9 3·72 3 5 5 - 7 - - - ' -~~:~1 
10 4.97 6 6 
- 5 - 14 - - . .-: -~;~1~1 -;, .;.-
ll 3·34 5 9 - 4 5 
l2 5.21 7 ll 
-
7 9 
13 3·72 5 ll - 7 - ll 
14 3.28 6 5 
-
9 6 
15 5.62 9 ll - 9 - 14 
16 3.48 6 9 5 - 9 
17 3.31 5 8 5 - - 9 4 
18 3.41 7 6 4 - - 8 6 
19 3.90 4 14 - 4 - 4 4 
20 4.14 ll 10 5 
- -
10 8 
21 3.69 8 10 4 
-
10 
- 7 
22 3·52 9 8 9 - - 13 7 
23 3.24 5 8 5 - 6 - 3 
24 4.55 8 9 - 14 - 8 7 
25 4.62 6 5 - ll 9 
CXI 
\Q 
- ~ 
Number and Probabillt;t; of Alternatives Absolute Strengths 
Subject F 2 Equal 4 Equal 2 Unequal 2 Unequal 4 Unequal 4 Unequal stronger Weaker 
Alterna- Alterna- Alterna- Alterna- Alterna- Alterna-
tives tives tives tives tives tives 
"More "Less "More "Less 
Probable" Probable" Probable" Probable" 
26 3-59 7 7 
-
6 9 
27 3-55 11 7 - 8 7 28 4. 76 9 14 - 9 - 9 29 2. 76 4 7 10 - - 5 5 
30 2.97 9 13 4 
-
5 - 4 
31 2-90 7 5 - 9 7 - 6 
32 2-59 7 7 8 - 12 - 4 
33 2.41 9 8 - 3 - 7 6 
34 2.48 14 12 10 - - 12 4 
35 2-59 4 9 13 - - 12 4 
36 3-07 3 11 5 - 4 - 2 
37 2.34 5 5 7 
-
6 
- - -
.- '}i~i 
38 1.52 12 13 - 12 - 13 - - ''l1.,~ 
39 1-93 4 8 - 3 6 - - - "'':li" •;'.' 
4o 2.93 5 13 - 5 6 41 2.31 5 12 - 4 - 9 42 3-10 6 7 - 8 5 
43 1.00 3 11 - 6 - 8 44 2.07 7 7 7 - 10 
45 1.76 10 5 5 - - 12 4 46 1-93 10 11 8 - - 14 3 
47 2.48 4 10 
-
4 
-
9 4 
48 2.69 8 9 7 - - 7 4 49 2-31 5 5 3 - 9 - 4 50 2.07 3 13 8 - - 13 5 51 3-17 4 5 2 - 5 - 2 
52 3-17 9 6 - 5 - 6 6 
53 3-10 6 7 
-
9 12 
54 3-00 8 10 - 5 11 
55 2.14 12 6 - 11 8 
'8 
o~-o-.'-· 
Subject 
56 
xl 
x2 
x3 
x4 
x5 
x6 
x7 
x8 
xl7 
xl8 
xl9 
x20 
x2l 
x22 
x23 
x24 
x29 
x30 
x3l 
x32 
x33 
x34 
x35 
x36 
x45 
x46 
x47 
F 
1.76 
4.17 
4.90 
4.41 
4.00 
3-86 
3·97 
4.10 
4.48 
3-3l 
3.41 
3-93 
4.14 
3-72 
3-52 
3-17 
4.52 
2.72 
3·07 
2.90 
2.62 
2.45 
2.48 
2.66 
3·07 
l.79 
2.10 
2.45 
Number and ProbabUity of Al.ternatives 
2 Equal 4 Equal - 2 Unequal 211nequal 4 lJiiequaJ-~ Unequal 
Al.terna- Al.teroa- Al.terna- Al.terna- Al.terna- Al.terna-
tives tives tives tives tives tives 
"More "Less "More "Lesa 
Probable" Probable" Probable" Probable" 
6 ll 8 5 
4 
5 
6 
2 
4 
4 
3 
2 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
2 
7 
4 
1 
6 
5 
2 
5 
6 
6 
4 
l 
4 
7 
'19 
.: ... ,. "·f1!;l. 
'''-" :2¥1 
·. ·: ;lf;,l!l 
';"[.h'U 
::;)'.-;/ 
' 
,,,. 
~ 
'·:-:. 
Subject 
x48 
x49 
x50 
x5l 
x52 
F 
2.69 
2.41 
2.07 
3-17 
3-17 
2 Equal 
Al.terua-
tives 
Numbezo and ProbabUity o£ Al.ternativea 
4 Equal 2 tmeqiial. 2 Oneqiml 4- u~~equal 4 Unequal 
Al.terna- Al.terna- Al.terua- Alterna- Al.terua-
tives tives tives tives tives 
"More "Less "More "Less 
Probable" Probable" Probable" Probable" 
Absolute strengths 
stronger Weaker 
4 
6 
6 
2 
9 
Notes: l. An x be£ore a subject's lllllllber indicates tbat this S was used solely in the "weaker" 
condition in the teat o£ the absolute strengths hypotheses. Accordi.Dgly 1 his data £or 
the other conditions are not tabulated. 
2. A blank cell indicates tbat the subject did not £all in tbat condition. 
3. High F subjects are numbered l through 28J low F are 29 through 56. 
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Abstract 
This study tests the proposition that the speed of 
recognition of ambiguous visual stimuli can be predicted 
from propositions derived from behavioral conflict theory, 
A literature review indicates that no common, generally 
accepted conceptualization or the nature of ambiguity 
exists, and that contusion abounds due to the myriad pur-
poses, defini tiona, and opera tiona involved in previous 
studies involving ambiguous tactors. 
100 
Several writers have suggested the similarity or ambigu-
ous stimuli to contlict-arousing stimuli; and several con-
flict factors have been shown to affect response time. 
Among these are the number, relative strengths, and absolute 
strengths of competing response tendencies. Accordingly, 
it was hYPothesized that time to final recognition of seri-
ally presented ambiguous stimuli would be a function of the 
number ot response alternatives available, their relative 
probabilities or occurrence, and their absolute strengths. 
Number ot alternatives were varied by allowing S's to choose 
between two or tour alternatives. Probabilities were varied 
by associating 3 to 1, 1 to 3. and even odds with the alterna-
tives. Two variations ot absolute strengths were induced by 
reinforcing or not reinforcing correct alternatives over a 
series ot tour trials preceding the critical trial. 
In addition, high and low authoritarian subjects were 
used to test the hypotheses that (a) high P subjects, be-
cause of their difficulty in handling conflict, would take 
longer to recognize the stimuli, and (b) that differences 
in authoritarianism would accentuate the other differences 
predicted. Form 40 - 45 of the P scale was used. 
Subjects were Boston university summer students taking 
introductory social science courses. Half were volunteers 
and half took part as a class requirement. The ratio of 
men to women was 2 to 1, and the mean age was 21.9 years. 
The subjects acted as their own controls. In each 
condition s saw a graduated series or fourteen 9" x 11" 
cards presented serially, in which the stimulus became 
progressively clearer. In each condition a different task 
was employed. Order of tasks, conditions, etc,, was sys-
tematically varied. Each card in a series contained four 
images (e.g., church, key, candlestick, and tlask} which 
could appear in one of two or one of four possible orders, 
according to the design. In addition, E assigned prob-
abilities to each alternative order ot a 3 to l, even, or 
1 to 3 proportion. To test the absolute strengths hypoth-
esis, the two equal-probabilities alternatives condition 
was expanded to five trials, the first four of which served 
to reinforce or non-reinforce the response to be correct on 
the fitth and critical trial. 
\' ':.··'· -
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S registered a response on each card by flipping one or 
the switches before him corresponding to the available 
alternatives or a "no guess" alternative. The recording oi' 
the response was done by E. Several measures were taken in 
addition to card number of final decision (recognition) in-
cluding card of first guess, card of first correct guess, 
and response time per card. These latter measures generally 
correlated significantly with final decision. 
'rhe major predictions were generally confirmed. A 
greater number or response alternatives yielded greater 
time to decision. An increase in absolute strengths or 
alternatives yielded greater time to decision among high, 
but not among low authoritarians. Alternatives with higher 
associated probabilities were correctly identified earlier 
than those with lower probabilities, but only when the 
verbal induction was followed by a trial in which the more 
probable alternative was correct (thus reinforcing the in-
structions which by themselves were not effective). 
The authoritarianism hypotheses were not generally con-
firmed, with the exception oi' the interaction with absolute 
strengths, as noted above. Several possible explanations 
tor this failure in hypotheses confirmation are offered. 
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